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RESULTS FROM THE WORKSHOP: 
ASSESSING AND MANAGING NATECHS 
(NATURAL-HAZARD TRIGGERED TECHNOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS) 
September 17-18, 2007 
Stresa, Italy 
A. M. CRUZ AND E. KRAUSMANN 
Summary 
The workshop: Assessing and Managing Natechs (Natural-hazard triggered technological accidents) was 
organised and hosted by the Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) at the Institute for the Protection and 
Security of the Citizen (IPSC) of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), on 17-18 
September 2007 in Stresa, Italy. The Natech workshop, the second of its kind to be organized the JRC, was 
carried out in an effort to provide a framework and practical tools for Natech risk assessment and management 
at the community level. The workshop included invited presentations on country practices which served to 
help monitor progress in Natech risk reduction since the first workshop in 2003.  
In addition to the country presentations, the two day workshop included discussion of key issues, presentations 
of new concepts/ information, hands-on exercises, and the development of case studies. In the case studies 
participants carried out a Natech risk assessment of a selected community. Discussion of case study results and 
possible Natech risk management strategies followed, as well as identification of future priorities for research 
and tool development.  
Objectives 
• Provide a framework and practical tools for Natech risk assessment and management at the community 
level 
• Enhance Natech awareness and promote Natech risk reduction 
• Promote discussion and improvement of the Natech risk assessment and management methodology 
presented identifying key Natech risk management strategies 
Format 
• Country presentations (Sept. 17, AM) 
• Preparation for case studies (Sept. 17, PM) 
• Case studies,  presentation of case study results, and identification of Natech risk management strategies 
(Sept. 18 AM & PM) 
Participants 
• Competent Authorities, civil protection authorities, other government officials interested in industrial risk 
reduction  
• Researchers and academics 
• Emergency managers and land-use planners 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The workshop: Assessing and Managing Natechs (Natural-hazard triggered technological 
accidents) was organised and hosted by the Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) at the 
Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen (IPSC) of the European Commission’s 
Joint Research Centre (JRC), on 17-18 September 2007 in Stresa, Italy. The Natech workshop 
was held back-to-back with the 7th IIASA-DPRI Forum on Integrated Disaster Risk Management 
co-organised and hosted by the JRC. The Natech workshop was attended by 25 participants from 
16 different countries. Participants to the workshop came from a variety of institutions including 
academia, government authorities and private enterprises. 
The Natech workshop, the second of its kind to be organized by the JRC1, was carried out in an 
effort to provide a framework and practical tools for Natech risk assessment and management at 
the community level. The workshop included invited presentations on country practices which 
served to help monitor progress in Natech risk reduction since the first workshop in 2003.  
In addition to the country presentations, the two day workshop included discussion of key issues 
and problems in Natech risk management, presentations of new concepts/ information, hands-on 
exercises, and the development of case studies. In the case studies participants worked in small 
groups to carry out a Natech risk assessment of a selected community. Group discussions of case 
study results and possible Natech risk management strategies followed.  Each group identified 
and prioritized key Natech risk reduction strategies. At the end of the second day the groups 
convened and proposed a set of key strategies for Natech risk reduction. The workshop agenda is 
included in Annex 1. 
This document contains a summary of the country presentations, group activities, case studies, 
and case study results.   
2. COUNTRY PRESENTATIONS 
There were seven presentations on industrial risk management and emergency response practices 
from the following countries: Slovenia, Germany, Austria, Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, and 
Greece. The content of these presentations is briefly summarized below. The original 
                                                 
1 The first Natech Workshop: Analysis of Natech Disasters: Natural Hazards Triggering Technological Disasters 
was organized jointly by the JRC and the United Nations’ International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR) 
on 20-21 October 2003 in Ispra, Italy. 
presentations are attached in Annex 2. The numbering follows the order of the presentations as in 
the agenda. 
 2.1 Slovenia 
Dusan Fajfar of IGEA gave an overview of GIS support for emergency management in Slovenia, 
a joint presentation by the Slovenian Ministry of Defence’s Administration for Civil Protection 
and Disaster Relief, and IGEA. D. Fajfar pointed out that Slovenia has very good background 
information in terms of maps which led to the development of a web-based system for 
emergency planning with a GIS core. The system contains hazard and risk maps with respect to 
natural and technological hazards (including data sheets on the safety of hazardous materials), 
cartographic background data, geo-located registers, environmentally sensitive areas and 
infrastructure. It is used by emergency centres in its desktop application; the web-based system is 
used for emergency planning and by rescue forces. The system also incorporates action plans to 
assist the decision-making process and which are defined for type of pre-defined event and 
impacted area (national, regional, local). Emergency response plans that existed only in paper 
format were digitised to facilitate access and keeping them up to date. By means of an example 
(a call to the EU emergency number 112) D. Fajfar demonstrated the various steps in support of 
managing a crisis situation. Furthermore, he presented the planned additions to the system, as 
well as a short overview of a web-based Emergency Incident Reporting System in which 
intervention reports by operators of emergency centres and rescue teams are recorded. 
In terms of Natech risk management, Milica Slokar provided the following information on two 
decrees in Slowenia that address chain effects in disasters such as a natural disaster triggering a 
chemical accident: 
a. Decree on the subject matter and compilation of emergency response plans, which defines: 
Emergency response plans shall include the determination of the likelihood of the chain of 
disasters such as fires, explosions, uncontrolled emissions of hazardous substances in the 
environment, floods, avalanches and land slides, erosion, destroyed water barriers, epidemics and 
epizootic, damage infrastructure, traffic accidents etc. The likelihood of the chain of disasters is 
recognized in the national emergency response plans in the event of an earthquake, in the event 
of a flood, during a plane accident, for a railway accident, in the event of the large fire in the 
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natural environment, in the event of terrorist use of weapons or means of mass destruction and/or 
in the event of a terrorist attack with conventional means. 
b. Decree on the prevention of larger disasters and mitigation of their consequences, 
which defines:  
The Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning identifies industrial plants, the 
distance between which is less than or equal to 700 m, and because of possible chain 
effects obliges the managers of these plants to exchange data and information and to take 
this information into consideration in their Environmental Risk plans, safety and security 
management systems, safety reports and emergency response plans. The Ministry also 
requires the managers to take part in the preparation of safety measures. This information 
is also sent to the RS Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief by the 
Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning. 
 2.2 Germany 
Roland Fendler of the Umweltbundesamt (UBA - Federal Environment Agency) of Germany 
presented the results of a UBA project that assessed the protection of selected industrial facilities 
against floods, earthquakes and storms. The project scope were establishments falling under the 
Seveso II Directive for all three natural hazards, and installations containing substances 
hazardous to water or those storing flammable gases in vessels for floods only.  
The results of the study revealed that authorities in Germany only consider riverine floods in 
flood hazard maps but do not consider flooding by flash floods, insufficient draining, and 
groundwater increase. Furthermore, it indicated that flood-protection requirements are 
insufficient at the moment and guidance is necessary on how to consider flood risk in safety 
concepts, safety reports and emergency plans. R. Fendler emphasised that Natechs are currently 
not adequately considered in the preparation of the safety reports. The study also highlighted the 
need to better understand the impact of climate change on Natech risk. 
The assessment of the protection of Seveso II installations against earthquakes and storms 
identified technical safety deficits and safety-relevant shortcomings in licensing procedures. As 
an example, the applied German standards for buildings do not take into account  
the combined risk of building collapse and the presence of hazardous materials handled or stored, 
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and are therefore inadequate for establishments as defined in the Seveso Directive. Along the 
same lines these standards may allow plastic deformation as life safety may  
 still be guaranteed. However, deformation may already result in hazardous materials releases to 
the environment. In addition, emergency plans for establishments need to consider the possible 
circumstances after an earthquake, and before, during and after a storm. 
 2.3 Austria 
Michael Struckl of the Austrian Federal Ministry for Economics and Labour gave an overview of 
the situation in terms of facilities with major-accident potential and regulatory requirements with 
respect to natural-hazard sources in the Seveso II context in Austria. His assessment indicated 
that earthquakes and floods are the major natural threats with respect to Natech risk. Safety 
reports usually assume that building codes provide sufficient protection against earthquakes; 
however, they should be considered explicitly in the hazard-assessment process. While most 
installations that pose a major-accident hazard lie well beyond the 100-yr flood zone, within 
which protection measures such as land-use planning or dam measures are required, in the safety 
reports only a 10,000-year flood is considered to pose a risk. This is justified by the actual siting 
of the facilities or existing protection measures, identified through a deterministic analysis, 
coupled with the precautionary principle. M. Struckl added that pipelines do pose problems but 
since they were not included in the Seveso II Directive he had omitted them from his 
presentation. 
 2.4 Romania 
Alexandru Ozunu of Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj presented some lessons learned from 
Natech events in Romania. He pointed out that the major natural hazards for Romania were 
landslides, earthquakes and in particular floods which have become more intense due to climate 
warming over the last couple of years. Using case studies A. Ozunu presented the dynamics of 
recent Natech events and summarised the response measures taken in the aftermath of these 
events, as well as the lessons learned. The presentation concluded with recommendations on how 
Natech risk could be reduced. He emphasised that measures need to be implemented at local 
level for them to be effective. Mr. Ozunu said that guidance on how to deal with hazards has 
been developed for local decision makers. 
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 2.5 Poland 
Slawomir Zajac of the Polish National Headquarter of the State Fire Service presented the main 
tasks and the organisational structure of the State Fire Service which is the competent authority 
for responding to accidents in the Seveso II context. There is no special system concerning the 
protection against Natech events in Poland, because they follow an all-hazards approach. The 
State Fire Service is the organiser of the National Rescue and Fire–Fighting System, whose main 
task is the protection of the life of citizens, property and the environment. Among all natural and 
technological disasters, major accident hazards are of particular importance. The most important 
natural disasters on Polish territory are floods and forest fires, which are considered in the risk 
assessment for the safety report of an installation with major-accident potential, as are high 
winds. Important issues are planning, assessing and mapping the risk, the influence of hazards 
related to industry (Seveso) and natural hazards (floods, forest fires) on safety planning and their 
impact on special strategies for critical infrastructure protection. 
 2.6 Bulgaria 
Boyko Ranguelov of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences gave an overview of the Bulgarian 
Institutions that play a role in crisis management and discussed the major natural-hazard threats 
for Bulgarian territory in the Natech context. These are earthquakes, floods, landslides and forest 
fires. Of those the latter three have resulted in Natechs and damage to lifelines since 2003. B. 
Ranguelov then compared the current Natech risk-assessment approach in Bulgaria with the one 
prior to Bulgaria’s EU accession, which has resulted in the implementation of EU acquis 
communautaire. Of particular importance is the Seveso II Directive that requires the assessment 
of natural threats to facilities processing or housing certain types and amounts of hazardous 
materials. Facilities for which a Natech risk assessment has been performed are for instance the 
Kozlodui nuclear power plant, chemical-process installations, high-voltage power transmission 
lines and main gas pipelines. 
B. Ranguelov concluded that Natech (Boyko used the term “Natech” in his presentation) 
prevention and mitigation measures now include standards in line with EU requirements and 
maximise the protection of the population. He pointed out that many improvements have been 
made but that there is still no clear strategy by the government on how to deal with Natech risk. 
Responsibilities are distributed throughout various ministries and civil-protection services which 
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complicates coordination of activities. Moreover, the focus is still on response rather than 
prevention.  
 2.7 Greece 
Anna Papachatzi of the Region of Attica, Directorate of Environment and Regional Planning, 
discussed the problem of Natech risk management in Greece from the point of view of land-use 
planning. She pointed out that there is a lack of monitoring and assessment of spatial 
development trends but also a lack of cooperation between the various administrative layers 
responsible for spatial planning. This poses less of a problem for newer development areas than 
for old ones where residential zones and technological areas are still mixed. Moreover, the 
approach to risk management is reactive and focuses on crisis management and not so much on 
prevention. No specific management systems are in place for the response to Natech disasters. A. 
Papachatzi highlighted the shortcomings of the current risk-management system using the 2007 
wildfires in Greece as example and concluded with proposals for a more effective prevention and 
mitigation of disasters in general. 
 2.8 Analysis of country practices 
It appears that none of the countries represented at the workshop have adopted any Natech-
specific or Natech-related regulations. All countries continue to address natural hazard risk 
separately from industrial risk, except for the analysis of “external hazards” called for under the 
Seveso II Directive, which provides, however, no specific actions or methodologies to reduce 
Natech risk. 
Nonetheless, there appears to be more awareness of the Natech problem. At least one country, 
Germany, has carried out a study to assess to what extent flooding (and earthquakes and storms) 
are being considered by industries for risk management purposes in that country. A full report of 
the study is available on line in German with an English summary (see Warm et al. 2007), and 
two papers (Fendler 2008, Beem et al. 2008) will soon appear in a special Natech issue of 
Journal of Natural Hazards. Further activities of the German Government are intended in context 
of the German Strategy on Adoption to the Effects of Climate Change. 
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3. INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP ACTIVITIES 
This section summarizes the individual and group activities carried out during the workshop. 
Activities included questions and problem solving, presentation of short videos followed by 
guided discussion, and presentations of material needed to carry out a Natech risk assessment. 
The following subsections summarize the activities and their results. 
3.1 Workshop expectations 
At the beginning of the workshop, participants were asked to respond to the following question: 
“What expectations do you have concerning the workshop? The following bullets summarize the 
responses given: 
a. Meet people, networking 
b. Gain knowledge of country practices, regulations and methodologies 
c. Study actual cases and lessons learned 
d. Share experiences about best practices and their implementation 
e. Discuss prevention and mitigation measures to control exposed populations (e.g., land 
use planning) 
f. Gain knowledge concerning stakeholder involvement  
The workshop fulfilled to a great extent these expectations. For example, the workshop offered 
participants an opportunity to meet and interact with other participants from various disciplines 
and countries. The country presentations offered an overview of country practices and existing 
regulations (or lack of) regarding Natech risk reduction. Furthermore, the country presentations, 
the videos and case study exercises provided material and information concerning actual cases 
and lessons learned from previous Natech events. The application of the risk assessment 
methodology to the case studies presented the opportunity to discuss and learn about potential 
Natech triggering mechanisms, Natech consequences and prevention and mitigation measures to 
reduce Natech risk to exposed people, property and the environment. During the case studies, 
participants were asked to discuss the different stakeholders that should be involved in Natech 
risk assessment and management and to role play various stakeholders during the risk assessment 
exercise. 
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3.2   Video presentations and discussion 
The second activity involved the presentation of two short videos. One video (6 min) concerned 
the large earthquake of magnitude Mw 7.4 on August 17, 1999 in Kocaeli, Turkey and the 
refinery fires that followed. The second video showed the recent flooding and oil spills from a 
refinery in Coffeeville, Kansas on June 26, 2007. After viewing the films, participants were 
asked to work in groups to answer the following questions: 
• What were the hazards in each case?  
• Were the hazards known by government officials; industry owners/operators; and/ or 
residents living in the vicinity of the industrial plants? 
• What prevention and/ or mitigation measures do you think had been taken before the 
Natech events to avoid damage or losses? Were they successful? Why or why not? 
The groups agreed that the natural hazards were a major earthquake and earthquake-triggered 
fires in the Turkey video; and major flooding and oil spill from a refinery in the second video. In 
both cases the natural hazard combined with anthropogenic hazards. All groups agreed that 
government officials probably knew about the natural hazards, or they preferred to “not know” 
about them; industrial owners/operators knew about plant hazards in their day-to-day operation; 
the community may or may not have been informed depending on their daily activities, 
proximity to the plant, and emergency response planning. It was noted that often, knowing that 
the hazard exists does not mean that you know or can imagine the possible accident scenarios. In 
the case of the earthquake, industry and government were probably aware of the potential 
consequences but the community was probably not aware. In the case of flooding the groups 
agreed that probably government, industry and the community were not fully aware of the 
hazards.  
Based on images from the earthquake video, the groups thought it seemed that mitigation 
measures existed, but were not designed to current standards, or that the design of the equipment 
was not adequate for the magnitude of the event. In the case of flooding, they thought that the 
site was probably evacuated, but no measures to protect the installation had been taken. 
Furthermore, the groups proposed that probably the dikes around storage tanks had been 
designed to contain chemicals if released, but had not been designed to keep water out in the case 
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of flooding. Other points that came out of the discussions included that mitigation measures that 
had probably been taken for internal day-to-day plant operation did not provide sufficient 
protection for a problem that became larger. Furthermore, mitigation measures that were in place 
likely failed due to the natural hazards. In the case of flooding, the groups agreed that if 
evacuation was ordered due to the floods, it also helped to reduce exposure to the hazardous-
materials (hazmat) releases. However, contamination of property and homes in the affected area 
remained. 
3.3 Concepts and definitions 
One important aspect of disaster risk management, particularly Natech disasters, is that it cannot 
be tackled by people working in one field alone, but that it requires bringing in expertise from 
various fields and diverse backgrounds to solve problems. However, often even people working 
in the same field do not always agree on the meaning of certain concepts or their definitions. 
Participants were asked to define various concepts including hazard, vulnerability, risk, disasters, 
and Natech disasters. A summary of the different definitions provided by the workshop 
participants is presented in Table 1.  Some definitions were similar and more general, others 
were quite specific. For example one participant defined vulnerability as the probability of an 
item to have structural damage, while another defined it as the ratio between number of 
casualties and the number of people in a given territory. This was not surprising as the two 
individuals come from different backgrounds; an engineer and a first responder, respectively. 
The purpose of the exercise was not to find a common definition for each of the concepts. Rather, 
the purpose of the exercise was to allow participants to understand other participants’ point of 
view, to be aware that these differences exist, and that whatever definition is used needs to be 
clearly stated to avoid misunderstandings or confusion. The following general working 
definitions were used for the remaining part of the workshop: 
• Hazard: A hazard is a source of danger. A hazard does not necessarily lead to harm but 
represents a potential to result in harm. 
• Vulnerability: Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable 
to cope with, injury, damage or harm. 
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• Risk: Risk is the combination of the frequency/ probability of occurrence and the 
consequence of a specified hazardous event. Risk therefore includes the likelihood of 
conversion of a hazard into actual delivery of injury, damage or harm. 
• Disaster: A disaster is a major natural or man-made destruction that far exceeds the 
coping ability of the affected area. 
• Natech: A Natech disaster is a technological accident triggered by a natural disaster 
which results in significant adverse effects to the health of people, property, and/or the 
environment. The technological accident can include damage to industrial facilities and 
damage to lifelines systems that can hamper response to the accident. 
In particular, this workshop is concerned mainly with Natechs involving hazardous materials 
releases triggered by the impact of natural disasters on industrial facilities. 
4. DEVELOPMENT OF CASE STUDIES 
Case studies were developed in order to carry out a Rapid Natech Risk Assessment of two 
selected communities. The case studies were set up using real data. However fictitious names 
were used for the communities to protect their identity.  
4.1 Setting the stage, review of materials 
Before beginning the case studies, workshop participants were presented material and tools that 
were considered useful in carrying out a preliminary (or rapid) Natech risk assessment to screen 
out those areas that pose the greatest threat of a Natech disaster in a community. 
Valerio Cozzani presented a simplified methodology which can be used to qualitatively estimate 
the likelihood of a hazmat release triggered by earthquakes and flooding. Ana Maria Cruz talked 
about various existing air dispersion models and software programs for accidental chemical 
releases. These include CAMEO, ALOHA, DEGADIS, BREEZE PRO, SAFER systems, among 
others. Ms. Cruz noted that CAMEO and RMP*Comp (the latter was used during the case 
studies for its simplicity) are freely available from the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA). All participants were provided with case study materials which contained a 
description of each case study community including information about the worst case natural 
hazard and the hazmats present in each case study region. In addition, maps of the case study 
areas, tables used during the assessment process, and a spreadsheet used for calculations and 
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results were also provided. All documents were made available in digital form for those who 
requested them. See Annex 2 for the case study materials. 
The participants were assigned to five groups. Three groups worked on a case study of a 
community in California and two on a community in Kocaeli. Before starting the group activities, 
Ms. Cruz reviewed the case study materials with all the participants. Laura J. Steinberg, Valerio 
Cozzani, Elisabeth Krausmann, and Michael Lindell, assisted with the case study exercises either 
as participants in one of the groups or working with the various groups to provide support with 
any questions concerning the risk assessment process.  
Each group was allowed some time to become familiar with the case study community. 
Participants became familiar with their community maps identifying where each hazmat 
tank/industry was located. They were asked to note areas of higher population density, location 
of vulnerability centers (e.g., schools, churches, stadiums), location of critical facilities (e.g., 
drinking water treatment plant, waste water treatment plant, electrical power station), location of 
emergency resources (e.g., fire departments, police departments, hospitals), and location of 
major transportation centers (e.g., airport, central train station, ports) and lifelines.  
4.2 Rapid Natech Risk Assessment (RNRA)2 applied to a case study community 
A territory may be subject to Natech risk if there exists in the territory both the risk of a natural 
hazard and the risk of hazardous materials releases from industrial facilities subject to the natural 
hazard. In this case, Natech risk assessment involves determining the likelihood of a hazardous 
materials release given a natural hazard occurring, and identifying possible adverse 
consequences that may result when establishments that house hazardous materials are exposed to 
the natural hazard forces. Due to the limited time available for the case study exercise, the 
natural hazards that each of the case study communities is subject to had already been identified 
in the case study description as the “worst case scenario” natural hazard. 
In the analysis we considered only the Natech risk posed by storage tanks which contain hazmats. 
We did not consider other parts of the plants such as processing equipment and pipelines where 
hazmats are processed and transported. Furthermore, due to time limitations, we did not include 
                                                 
2 Cruz, A. M. and N. Okada (2007). “Methodology for Preliminary Assessment of Natech Risk in Urban Areas.” To 
appear in Journal of Natural Hazards 
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all the hazmat containing storage tanks that were actually present in each of the communities for 
the case study exercise. Instead, we selected a sample of 20 tanks for each case study for the 
purpose of demonstrating the application of the methodology.  
The proposed methodology involved estimating a Natech risk index for each hazmat containing 
storage tank given the natural disaster, in both case studies, a major earthquake, according to the 
following expression:  
    NRI  =  [HRL] * [D +Area_sc + C]   Eq. (1) 
where:  
HRL: is a score that indicates the hazmat release likelihood of each hazmat containing 
storage tank given the earthquake 
D:  is a score that measures the potential consequences of the hazmat release on other 
hazmat containing storage tanks given the earthquake 
Area_sc: is a score that measures the potential consequences of the hazmat release on the 
population given the earthquake 
C:  is a score that measures the potential consequences of the hazmat release on the 
environment and on essential facilities that are critical for the safety and well being of 
the community given the earthquake 
NRIs for each unit of territory could then be added up to estimate an NRIarea_sc area score. 
The RNRA involved estimating HRL, and then estimating the potential consequences of the 
release to people, property and the environment given the earthquake. 
4.2.1 Estimating the hazmat release likelihood (HRL) 
The first step in the RNRA was to determine the hazmat release likelihood (HRL) from a storage 
tank due to the worst case natural hazard which could result in offsite impacts to the population. 
HRL can take a value from 1-5, where 1 is low likelihood and 5 is high likelihood of release.  
Table 1 was used to guide the qualitative estimate of HRL for each tank.  
In determining HRL values, each group considered information regarding the natural hazard, 
such as the earthquake magnitude and intensity, and the type of storage tank, the type of hazmat, 
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type of storage conditions, presence or lack of safety and mitigation measures, as well as absence 
of these measures and other emergency response capacity due to earthquake damage.  
The groups used the framework developed by Cozzani et al. (2007), and presented by Prof. 
Cozzani during the workshop, for the assessment of the likelihood of a hazmat release induced 
by an earthquake. The spreadsheets contained information regarding the type of storage tank 
(e.g., vertical cylinder, horizontal cylinder), and the expected peak ground acceleration related to 
the scenario event at each tank location. With this information it was possible to determine a 
qualitative value from 1 to 5, where 1 was low and 5 was high vulnerability of the storage tank to 
the natural hazard. The estimated value was input in Row 1 of Table 2 for each tank.  
Each group qualitatively estimated a score corresponding to the vulnerability of each hazmat 
containing storage tank due to the type of chemical (e.g., toxic gas, flammable gas, toxic or 
flammable liquid), and storage conditions (e.g., atmospheric, pressurized, refrigerated) when 
subject to the natural hazard forces. Common problems observed during previous earthquakes 
were discussed to help estimate HRL. For example, intentional releases of refrigerated liquefied 
gases, such as anhydrous ammonia, have been reported in several cases due to prolonged power 
outages following earthquakes. Flammable and toxic liquids stored in atmospheric tanks are 
more likely to be released due to liquid sloshing with consequent damage to the tanks’ shells. 
Flammable gases are often stored liquefied under pressure in spherical tanks, or in horizontal 
cylindrical tanks. Damage to tank support structures have been observed and may lead to rupture 
of connected pipelines resulting in hazmat releases. Nonetheless, pressure vessels are generally 
built to more stringent design standards, and with better quality materials, and are therefore more 
resistant to external forces. Each group estimated these vulnerability values for each tank, and 
entered the results in Row 2 of Table 2.  
Using information provided for each case study, each group determined the vulnerability of each 
hazmat containing storage tank due to potential lack of risk management practices in general 
during normal day to day plant operation. If there was not sufficient information provided for 
each plant, the group members were asked to make assumptions and to use these assumptions to 
support their decisions. The estimated values were input in Row 3 of Table 2. Finally, each 
group estimated a qualitative value for the vulnerability of each hazmat containing storage tank 
due to the potential impact of the earthquake on the existing safety and mitigation measures and 
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emergency response capacity. Each group input the estimated values in Row 4 of Table 2. The 
scores in Table 2 were then added up and the total score was divided by the total number of 
criteria to obtain an average score. HRL values for each tank were then input, by each group, in 
the spreadsheet provided under the column heading HRL. 
4.2.2 Consequence analysis 
The next step concerned carrying out a consequence analysis to determine the area that could 
potentially be impacted by each Natech event. For this purpose the EPA’s software RMP*Comp 
was used. 
The extent and consequences of each release will depend on a number of factors including the 
type of chemical stored (e.g., toxic, flammable, explosive), storage tank type and storage 
conditions, the quantity present, and the potential to trigger secondary hazmat releases. To 
estimate the area of impact we need to estimate for toxic gases and liquids the maximum distance 
that a toxic cloud would travel, or for flammable gases the maximum distance that an 
overpressure wave would travel from its source and still represent a source of harm to people, 
property and the environment. This distance value is referred to as the maximum distance to an 
endpoint (MDE). The MDE will vary depending on the toxic effect threshold, for toxic gases, 
and over pressure threshold, for flammable gases, used. A common threshold used for accidental 
hazmat releases is the ERPG2 value set by the American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA). 
According to the AIHA (2007), the ERPG2 value is: 
 “The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals 
could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or 
other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair an individual’s ability to take 
protective action.” 
In the case of flammable substances a common threshold value used for emergency planning 
purposes is an overpressure wave of 7 kPa (1 psi). According to EPA (2004), an overpressure of 
7 kPa is unlikely to have serious direct effects on people; however, this overpressure may cause 
property damage such as partial demolition of houses, which can result in injuries to people, and 
shattering of glass windows, which may cause skin laceration from flying glass. 
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Using the above threshold criteria, each group was asked to estimate the MDE for the 20 hazmat 
containing storage tanks in their communities. The results were input for each tank in the 
spreadsheet in the column header MDE. Each group then drew circles of radius MDE around 
each tank on the maps provided to them to visualize the potential area of impact for each hazmat 
in their community. 
4.2.3 Estimating potential domino effects, D 
The consequences of a hazmat release could increase depending on whether it can trigger 
secondary, tertiary, or more events. For the purpose of the analysis we only consider here the 
potential for secondary chemical accidents (also known as domino chemical accidents) triggered 
by a fire or explosion of flammable gases liquefied under pressure. A primary event, such as a 
fire or explosion, can trigger a domino chemical accident due to the blast overpressure wave, fire 
impingement and heat radiation, impact of fireball, and impact from missiles and projectiles on 
neighbouring storage tanks. 
For the purpose of the case study exercise, we assumed that a domino chemical accident could 
occur if the distance between a flammable hazmat containing storage tank and any other 
neighbouring hazmat containing storage tank was less or equal to 1/2 the MDE value. This value 
was used to demonstrate the application of the methodology, although it would be unlikely to 
observe domino effects at this threshold value. The closer other hazmat containing storage tanks 
are to the source (distance below MDE/2) the more likely domino effects are, if an initial hazmat 
fire or explosion did occur. For further discussion on observed domino effects at various 
distances from the source see Cozzani and Salzano (2004), Birk (1998), and Birk et al. (2007). 
For the purpose of demonstrating the methodology, each group determined if there was one or 
more hazmat containing storage tanks located within it each circle of radius MDE/2 for all 
flammable gases liquefied under pressure. When the MDE of a potential primary accident 
involving a flammable gas liquefied under pressure included that of a potential secondary hazmat 
storage tank, no additional consequence was expected even if domino effect could take place. 
Table 3 was used to guide the estimation of domino effects, D. 
The closer a neighbouring storage tank is to the initial chemical accident, the higher the 
likelihood that it can be affected. A higher number of storage tanks within the MDE/2 circle 
poses more problems, because there is more property exposed, but also because even if nearby 
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tanks are not affected during the initial event, fires triggered by the first event will require that 
neighbouring tanks be kept cool to avoid over-pressurization and possible explosion. Keeping 
tanks cool becomes more and more difficult with an increase in the number of tanks exposed. 
Each group estimated a score due to the increased hazard and hence potential vulnerability of 
exposed tanks located within the MDE/2 circle. Estimated values were input in Row 1 of Table 3.  
The vulnerability of the population due to potential domino effects could increase if a domino 
chemical accident increases the overall area affected by the primary technological accident. For 
every potential domino chemical accident, each group calculated the MDE, and then drew circles 
of MDE radius around each tank exposed to domino effects. In the cases where all the new 
circles were completely contained within the first circle the resulting increase in vulnerability 
due to an increase in exposure area is close to zero. In this case a score of one was entered in 
Row 2 of Table 3. Scores in Table 3 were added up and the total score was divided by the total 
number of criteria to obtain an average score for each tank. Estimated domino effects, D, values 
for each tank were input in the spreadsheet under the corresponding column heading by each 
group. 
4.2.4 Estimating an area vulnerability score, Area_sc 
Everything in the area of radius MDE around the hazmat containing tank is potentially exposed 
and vulnerable to the Natech event. The next step involved determining what was exposed, and 
how vulnerable the exposed elements were to the hazmat release given the earthquake scenario. 
Each group then qualitatively estimated an area vulnerability score, Area_sc. To calculate the 
Area_sc the groups considered factors such the number of people exposed (or population density 
when population values were not known) following the earthquake, the distribution of the 
population during or immediately following the earthquake, presence of population centres (e.g., 
universities, large enterprises, shopping centres) or more vulnerable population groups (e.g., the 
elderly, the sick, children) who might have more difficulties in evacuating if needed, or who may 
be unable to take shelter during the earthquake. Those who live in low income housing may also 
be more vulnerable because their homes are more likely to suffer damage during the earthquake 
(e.g., due to lack of seismic restraints or use of lower quality materials) or are less likely to serve 
as a place for shelter. Area_sc values range from 1-5, where 1 indicates very low vulnerability 
and 5 is very high vulnerability. Table 4 was used to estimate Area_sc values. The sum of the 
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scores was divided by the total number of factors considered, to obtain an average score for the 
Area_sc.  The Area_sc values were input in the spreadsheet under the Area_sc column heading. 
4.2.5 Estimating vulnerability due to impacts on essential facilities, C 
The next step concerned estimating vulnerability due to impacts on essential facilities, and the 
environment, C. Essential facilities are those that are considered critical for maintaining the 
safety and well being of the public including public utilities, lifeline systems, emergency 
resources, emergency response capacity. Furthermore, we include here any potential impacts on 
the environment, particularly water bodies that constitute sources of drinking water or other 
natural resources that constitute the livelihood for a community. Potential consequences on 
essential facilities from the Natech can occur if these lie in areas located within any circle of 
radius MDE of the hazmat containing storage tank affected by the earthquake. For example, a 
toxic release might impede the passage of rescue teams trying to help trapped earthquake victims 
on the other side of the city, while at the same time blocked roads (due to debris from the 
earthquake) could delay arrival of hazmat teams to a contaminated area.  
To estimate C the groups determined whether there were any critical facilities including public 
utilities (e.g., water treatment plants, waste treatment facilities), major lifelines (e.g., major roads 
and bridges, major water or gas lines), and any important emergency resources located within the 
area of impact of each potential Natech event. Furthermore, they assessed whether the 
earthquake effects outside the Natech impact area would result in a reduction of emergency 
response capacity to deal with each Natech event. Finally, the groups determined if there were 
any natural/environmental resources or delicate ecosystems affected by each potential Natech 
event that would result in increased consequences to exposed elements. Table 5 was used to 
estimate vulnerability due to impact of each Natech on essential facilities and the environment, C. 
The total score was divided by the total number of criteria in the table to obtain an average C 
score. Estimated C scores were input under the corresponding column heading in the spreadsheet. 
4.2.6 Estimating a Natech Risk Index for each tank 
The estimated values for HRL, D, Area_sc, and C were input in Eq. (1) to calculate the NRI 
value for each tank. Each group was asked to map the estimated NRI values for each hazmat 
containing tank using symbols proportional to their magnitude on their case study maps.  
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4.2.7 Case study results 
The groups were given about 2.5 hours to work on their case studies and to do the calculations. 
They were also given time to prepare a short summary of the case study results, and to prepare a 
5-10 min presentation of the results.  
Due to the limited time available, only two groups actually completed the analysis of the 20 
tanks. The other groups completed the assessment of 3-5 tanks. In reviewing the results of the 
groups some errors were noted; indicating that the methodology needs to be better explained, and 
that perhaps a few examples need to be carried out jointly before the groups work on the case 
studies.  
It appears that there was little difficulty in understanding and estimating HRL values. It was 
observed that almost all the groups had at least one engineer. Some participants questioned 
whether an assessment team that does not include an engineer would be able to understand the 
procedure for estimating HRLs. The point was well taken and needs to be considered in any 
future workshops and application of the methodology to a community. 
MDE values were estimated using different release conditions and mitigation assumptions by 
each of the groups. Thus, the results obtained for the same tank by two different groups might 
vary. For instance, the complete release of 66,000 kg of refrigerated anhydrous ammonia (the 
methodology called for the worst case, 10 min release, no mitigation measures available) would 
result in an MDE of 3.2 km However, if a group assumed that there were some mitigation 
measures in place, such as a containment building, the MDE value would be significantly smaller. 
The assumption of a worst case scenario was suggested because it made the use of the 
RMP*Comp much easier, requiring less knowledge, and also to make the results comparable.  
 In the RNRA methodology, domino effects are considered only for flammable gases liquefied 
under pressure. However, some of the groups estimated D for other types of materials (e.g., toxic 
gases) which are not very likely (Kourniotis et al. 2000, Khan and Abbasi 1998). 
Tables 6a, 6b, 6c and 6d present the completed spreadsheets for four of the groups.  The overall 
results are not comparable between the groups due to differences in the initial assumptions for 
the consequence and vulnerability analysis, and the fact that the groups did not have time to 
finish the analysis for all the tanks.  
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Nonetheless, it is possible to compare some individual NRI estimates. For example, Groups A 
and B (Cover City), Tables 6a and 6b, respectively, obtained high NRI scores for Tank 1 (T1) 
and Tank 8 (T8). T1 in Cover City contains 180,000 kg of chlorine gas. If the contents were 
allowed to be released completely (worst case), the distance to the toxic endpoint (MDE) would 
be 32 km, putting the entire city’s population at risk. Groups A and B estimated Area_sc scores 
for T1 as 5 and 4.3 respectively. T8 contains butane, a flammable gas stored liquefied under 
pressure in a spherical tank. The explosion of the tank and its contents would result in damage 
and minor injuries to people as far as 1.1 km. Domino effects might result if exposed elements 
are within 550 m from the source. Tanks 6 and 7 are within impact range of Tank 8. Thus, the 
extra risk from the possible damage caused by T8 on tanks 6 and 7 is reflected in the D scores of 
4.5 and 4.33, estimated by groups A and B, respectively, for T8. Annex 4 contains Group B’s 
detailed case study report.  
4.2.8 Discussion 
Each group was asked to discuss the results and to talk about the difficulties and issues the group 
had in applying the RNRA to the case study. The groups were also asked to think about the 
difficulties and issues that might come up in doing a RNRA in their own community. The groups 
then convened and a short discussion among all participants followed. Because of the short time 
allowed for discussion, participants were asked to send their comments via e-mail. The following 
bullets summarize the issues raised and/or discussed: 
o All of the participants agreed that the case study exercise was useful for them, and helped 
to improve their knowledge and understanding of the Natech problematic and its 
complexity.  
o The participants felt that more detail was needed in order to estimate HRL values. They 
considered that in order to estimate HRL the assessment team needs more 
engineering/chemical processing knowledge, or more detailed guidance so that 
assumptions are correctly made and criteria correctly estimated. Thus, they questioned 
whether or not expert opinion was needed.  
o M. Dandoulaki observed that the profile of the assessment team should be somehow 
taken into account. She asked for example “what disciplines are required at a minimum? 
Would it be possible for a non-chemical engineer or someone not having knowledge on 
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chemicals to assess the risk to people regarding the release of chemicals? If not, what 
information would be useful to help understand the issue better?” 
o Dandoulaki also stressed that the same applies with earthquake structural vulnerability of 
the installations. What information is required to help chemical engineers or other non-
engineering team members to understand better the issue. Dandoulaki stressed that she 
does not mean more tables, but essential information. Sometimes, she notes, tables and 
numbers can be misleading because they easily hide the complexities.  
o Many participants stressed the need to include the effects of the simultaneous natural 
disasters when estimating values for the various criteria particularly when calculating 
Area_sc and C scores. It is the conjoint natural disaster that makes the Natech situation so 
different and complex. 
o B. Ranguelov suggested that the methodology be converted into a software tool - easy for 
operation with all details (tables, steps of the algorithm , etc.) in one program. This would 
be a really nice tool for RNRA exercises. 
o E. Laor suggested that local government operational capacity to confront the approaching 
disaster be included in the assessment. Physical exposure and vulnerability of emergency 
response resources are considered when estimating the C scores. Other criteria can be 
included to better capture the effect of local government (as well as industrial or private) 
operational capacity. 
o Prof. Gupta suggested that an exercise involving cyclone, flood or any other natural event 
may be framed in addition to the earthquake one to give a broader background in doing 
calculations and appreciating the damage these can cause. 
5. NATECH RISK MANAGEMENT 
The case studies provided a (hands-on) opportunity to carry out a Natech risk assessment of a 
community. The exercise allowed participants to become familiar with Natech specific issues 
and to get a feel for the complexity in identifying and assessing Natech risk.  The following 
exercises and group discussions were focused on Natech risk management.  
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5.1 Probability of a Natech 
Following the discussion of the case studies, participants were asked to write down what they 
considered to be the worst case natural disaster used for planning purposes in the 
region/jurisdiction where they live. Each participant was asked to specify the type of natural 
disaster, the expected magnitude, and location with his/her jurisdiction. Then, they were asked to 
give an approximate estimate from 0-100% of the probability of a Natech occurring as a result of 
that disaster. Each participant was then asked to describe the potential consequences of the 
Natech event such as the type of industry affected, chemical released, extent of area impacted 
and number of people affected. All participants who lived in areas subject to natural and hazmat 
release hazards considered that Natechs were likely with probability estimates ranging from 1% - 
100% depending on local conditions. Table 6 presents a summary of the participants’ responses. 
5.2 Strategies for Natech risk management 
Each group was asked to propose strategies for Natech risk reduction for both community and 
for industry. Implementing risk reduction generally has a cost. Thus, each group was asked to 
discuss what would be the main problems and challenges in implementing each of the proposed 
Natech risk management strategies in their jurisdiction; by government officials and policy 
makers in charge, and by industry owners/ operators. Groups were asked to think about which of 
these strategies should be recommended; which should be mandated? 
Following this exercise the groups then convened in a plenary session to identify those Natech 
risk management strategies that were considered priority key strategies to be recommended and 
/or mandated. 
The following bullets summarize key Natech risk reduction strategies proposed for government 
agencies/ policy decision makers: 
• Comprehensive hazard identification and analysis that considers Natechs 
• Natech risk assessment 
• Land use planning to reduce population exposure (e.g. relocation of people/hazardous 
facilities) 
• Structural and non-structural measures specific for Natechs 
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• Warning systems and evacuation plans that take into account Natech 
• Community Right To Know 
• Liability and compensation framework for Natechs 
• Enact and enforce enabling legislation (e.g., extra obligations for industry exposed to 
Natech hazards) 
• Research to better understand Natech risk in the face of climate change 
• Educational and awareness campaigns 
The following bullets summarize key Natech risk reduction strategies proposed for industry 
owners/ operators: 
• Use common cause failure analysis for system design  
• Structural safety measures and additional safety barriers (e.g., back up lifelines) for 
Natechs 
• Emergency planning that considers failure of emergency response equipment – “stand 
alone” plan – i.e. not relying on external lifelines 
• Adequate separation between critical elements for Natech scenarios 
The participants identified possible barriers to Natech risk reduction strategy implementation 
including: 
• Industry resistance to additional regulatory burden 
• Effectiveness versus cost of implementation 
• Ignorance (not money) 
• Land use planning is limited by existing development 
• Belief that nothing is going to happen, or that it will not affect them 
6. WRAP-UP AND CLOSURE 
The Natech workshop was a learning experience for all those who attended. The workshop 
provided an open atmosphere where people coming from diverse backgrounds and cultures could 
share experiences and knowledge on Natech risk management, and learn from each other.  
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We believe the workshop objectives were reached. The workshop provided a framework and 
practical tools for Natech risk assessment and management at the community level. The various 
individual and group exercises and discussions helped to clarify the Natech problematic. 
Furthermore, participants agreed that the workshop raised their awareness of the need to address 
Natech risk and to work together to identify strategies for Natech risk reduction.  
The country presentations offered an overview of country practices, and pointed out the lack of 
Natech-specific regulations to address Natech risk. It was encouraging to learn about the work 
being carried out by the German government in trying to understand the extent of the problem in 
their territory and identifying possible mechanisms for improved safety and risk reduction.  
The workshop has also provided lessons for the organizers. It became apparent that we were too 
optimistic with respect to time and included too many activities. Thus, in the future, we will need 
to shorten the amount of material presented and discussed, or divide the workshop into two 2-day 
workshops allowing more time for discussion, awareness raising, etc. and more time for the 
presentation of the RNRA methodology, its application and discussion of results, etc.   
The Natech workshop was adjourned at 17:30 on 18 September 2007. 
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CONCEPT DEFINITION 
HAZARD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Something which is a potential threat to a person, community, environment or structure 
- A natural or technological phenomena which imposes risk upon a population 
- A characteristic condition of a system that can harm people, property or environment 
- A hazard is for example a characteristic of a plant which can generate an accident. A potential source of accident 
- Adverse effects resulting in loss of life, property, or causing environmental problems 
- A potential event that can cause harm 
VULNERABILITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- How able a thing or person/animal is to resist or recover from a particular hazard 
- Ratio between number of casualties divided by number of people in a given territory 
- The susceptibility of people, property or the environment to harm from hazards 
- The vulnerability is the probability of an item to have structural damages 
- Degree of being affected by hazards 
- Degree to which an exposed element can suffer from the hazard 
RISK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Probability of something bad occurring 
- An action that could lead to something bad occurring 
- The order of hazard to hit a given population  
- The probability that harm can result from a hazard 
- The risk is a function which depends on frequency and on magnitude of an event 
- Possibility of a specific hazard to be realized 
- The probability of the hazard and its consequences 
DISASTER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- A change in the normal routine which changes temporarily or permanently a person’s life, the environment or the community 
- Death, injury, displacement of hundreds of thousands due to materialization of hazard 
- An event that can cause so much harm that it overwhelms the response capacity 
- Disaster can not be measured by “response capacity” 
- A disaster is a situation of big magnitude and low frequency, like a major accident 
- Events that affect group of people or large extend of the environment beyond the coping capacity of the community 
- An event that overwhelms the capacity of a community to respond to it 
NATECH DISASTER 
 
 
 
 
 
- A technological disaster triggered by a natural disaster 
- The same as disaster, only caused by a chain of hazards 
- The natural hazard causes the technological disaster 
- A Natech disaster is a major [chemical] accident triggered by a natural event  
- A technological disaster as a consequence of a natural event, i.e. natural hazard or natural disaster. 
- A natural disaster triggered hazardous material release 
 
Table 1. Concepts and definitions 
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Table 2.  Scoring table which can be used to estimate an HRL score for each hazmat containing 
storage tank. The total score is divided by the total number of criteria to obtain an average score. 
Weights can be used instead to give more or less importance to each of the criteria.  
                     
Scoring 
Criteria 
1 
Very low 
2 
Low 
3 
Medium 
4 
High 
5 
Very High 
 
Total  
1. Vulnerability of 
storage tank (by 
type) to natural 
hazard 
      
2. Vulnerability 
due to chemical 
properties and 
storage conditions 
      
3. Vulnerability 
due to loss of safety 
and mitigation 
measures due to 
the natural disaster  
      
4. Vulnerability 
due to lack of risk 
management 
practices 
      
5. Other 
 
 
      
 Sum 
 
 
      
Average HRL score 
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Table 3. Scoring table which can be used to estimate vulnerability due to potential domino 
chemical accidents, D, caused by the earthquake triggered hazmat release. The total score is 
divided by the total number of criteria to obtain an average score. Weights can be used instead to 
give more or less importance to each of the criteria.  
Domino effects are only analyzed for flammable substances. 
 
Scoring 
Criteria 
1 
Very low  
2 
Low 
3 
Medium 
4 
High 
5 
Very High 
 
Total 
1. Vulnerability due 
to presence of hazmat 
tanks within MDE/2 
circle and their 
proximity 
      
2. Vulnerability due 
to increase in impact 
area due to domino 
accident 
      
3.  Other 
 
 
      
Sum 
 
 
      
Average D score 
(or weighted D score) 
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Table 4. Scoring table which can be used to estimate an area vulnerability score, Area_ sc, for 
each area impacted by the hazmat release given the earthquake. The total score is divided by the 
total number of criteria to obtain an average score. Weights can be used to give more or less 
importance to each of the criteria. 
 
 
Scoring 
Criteria 
1 
Very low  
2 
Low 
3 
Medium 
4 
High 
5 
Very High 
 
Total 
1. Number of people 
exposed given the 
natural disaster 
      
2. Population 
distribution given the 
natural disaster 
      
3. Presence of 
population centers, 
or more vulnerable 
groups  (old, sick, 
children)   
 
      
4. Presence of low 
income neighborhood 
which could result in 
increased exposure 
 
      
5. Other       
Sum 
 
 
      
Average Area_sc 
score 
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Table 5. Scoring table which can be used to estimate C, the vulnerability due to impact of a 
Natech on public utilities, major lifelines, emergency resources, and emergency response 
capacity, among others. The total score is divided by the total number of criteria to obtain an 
average score. Weights can be used to give more or less importance to each of the criteria. 
 
Scoring 
Criteria 
1 
Very low  
2 
Low 
3 
Medium 
4 
High 
5 
Very High 
 
Total 
1. Vulnerability due 
presence of public 
utilities  (e.g., 
drinking water and 
waste water 
treatment, electrical 
power stations) in 
Natech area 
      
2. Vulnerability due 
to presence of major 
lifelines (e.g., major 
roads, oil and gas 
pipelines, major 
water pipelines) in 
Natech area 
      
3. Vulnerability due 
to presence of 
emergency resources 
(e.g., fire stations, 
supply warehouses, 
hospitals) in Natech 
area 
      
4. Vulnerability due 
to loss of emergency 
response capacity 
outside Natech area 
 
      
5. Vulnerability due 
to presence of 
delicate ecosystems 
and/or environmental 
Systems (e.g., river, 
lake, ground water) 
in Natech area 
      
6. Other 
 
 
 
      
Sum 
 
 
      
C = Average score 
(or average weighted 
score) 
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Table 6a. Spreadsheet for Cover City, Group A 
 
 
Table 6b . Spreadsheet for Cover City, Group B. 
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Table 6c. Spreadsheet for Cover City, Group C. 
 
*MDE values do not correspond to worst case. The group assumed alternative scenarios with mitigation measures in place for each tank.  See Table 6b for worst case 
MDE values. ** D should be estimated only for flammable gases liquefied under pressure 
 
Table 6d . Spreadsheet for Ankesi City, Group D. 
 
*D should only be estimated for flammable gases liquefied under pressure. **These scores need to be recalculated based on the corrected domino effects value ,D-
redone. 
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Table 7. Summary of participants’ responses concerning worst case natural disaster and Natech probability in their communities. 
Region Name Earthquake and other 
geological hazards 
Floods, storms and other 
hydro-meteorological hazards 
Description of event/ area affected 
Emilia Romagna 
Region 
Clarissa Dondi EQ only mountain area –5% 
chance of Natechs 
Floods – 35% chance of Natechs EQ hazard only in mountain zone, particularly in the 
east 
Sardinia Michela Campedel EQ triggered tsunami - Natechs 
possible 
 EQ triggered tsunami impacting coast line where a 
major refinery is located 
Texas Michael Lindell  F3 tornado - 1% chance of 
Natechs 
Hazmat facilities occupy only a small percentage of 
the area. However, hazmat facilities located in 
populated areas 
Athens (industrial 
area), Greece 
Anna Papachatzi EQ – 100% Floods 100% chance of Natechs 3 very high annoyance factories, residential areas, 
huge disaster 
Istanbul, Turkey Serkan Girkin EQ > 7 magnitude – 90% chance 
of Natechs 
 Petrochemical industry, chemical industry, gas 
pipelines – Area affected by Natechs can be small 
Dessau-Roßlau, 
Germany 
Roland Fendler  Storm >150km/hr winds – 50% 
chance of Natechs 
Chemical accident triggered by high winds, storm 
   Floods, 2m, 100 yr event – 1% 
chance of Natechs 
Only 1 art. 6 Seveso industry. Water contamination 
scenario likely, high number of people (> 500). 
Wuhan, China Wang Xianhua  Floods  
Cluj County, 
Romania 
Alexandru Ozunu  Flash floods (2-3 days) – 30% 
chance of Natechs 
Natech accident involving chlorine release (50 tons) 
Haifa Bay, Ashood 
Gaza Ramat Hovav, 
Israel 
Efraim Laor EQ (Mw 6.5-7.5) along Red Sea 
Fault or Carmel Fault – Natechs 
possible 
  
Vienna, Austria Michael Struckl EQ – 0.1 % chance of Natechs Extreme wind or snow loads – 1% 
chance of Natechs 
Winds: roof collapse or foundation collapse of 
buildings; EQ: collapse of construction, hazmat 
release; Natech would affect about 10-100 ha and 
about 500-5000 people 
Scaton Delaval, 
Whirley Bay, UK 
Komal Raj Aryal  Floods, high winds, tornado – 
15% chance of Natechs 
We have a cosmetics plant in 0.5 km radius. If 
impacted about 400 households would be affected 
Athens (centre), 
Greece 
Miranda Dandoulaki EQ (M 6-7) – 0% chance of 
Natechs 
Storm with strong winds, heat 
wave (42oC for 3 days), snow – 
damage to lifelines possible 
Lycabetus Hill (center), chain effects, failure of 
lifelines:  
EQ: 90%; Heat wave: 100%; Storm/winds: 80%; 
Snow: 75% 
Kanpur, India J. P. Gupta  Floods – 2% chance of Natechs Release from paints and raw materials factory, area 
about 2 km2; fire and environmental damage 
Karlsruhe, Germany Valentin Bertsch  Storms- 10% chance of Natechs Potential domino effects: power outage, general 
infrastructure breakdown, all industrial sectors 
affected 
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ANNEX 1  
 
NATECH WORKSHOP 
Stresa, Italy, September 17-18, 2007 
 
Agenda 
 
DAY 1 
8:30 – 9:20 Welcome  
 
Presentation of workshop agenda and dynamics 
Introductions and Workshop expectations 
AM Cruz 
E Krausmann 
Cruz, Krausmann 
All 
9:20 – 10:40 Country Presentations   
1. Slovenia D. Fajfar 
2. Germany R. Fendler 
 
3. Austria  M. Struckl  
10:40 – 11:00 Coffee break  
11:00 – 12:30 Country Presentations cont.   
4. Romania A. Ozunu 
5. Poland S. Zajac 
6. Bulgaria B. Ranguelov 
 
7. Greece A. Papachatzi 
12:30 – 14:00 Lunch  
Natech risk assessment and management: 
Tools and skills 
Preparation for case studies 
All 
Cruz, Cozzani, Krausmann, 
Steinberg 
14:00 – 17:30  
15:30 – 16:00 Coffee break  
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DAY 2 
 
Case studies: working groups All 9:00 – 12:30 
10:30  – 11:00 Coffee Break  
12:30 – 14:00 Lunch  
Presentation of case study results 
Discussion 
All 14:00 – 15:30 
15:30 – 16:00 Coffee break  
15:30 – 17:30 Natech risk management strategies 
Conclusions and closing of meeting 
All 
AM Cruz  
E Krausmann 
LJ Steinberg 
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COUNTRY PRESENTATIONS 
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GIS Support for Emergency 
Management in Slovenia
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
Milica Slokar, Ministry of 
Defence, Administration of 
the Republic of Slovenia for 
Civil Protection and Disaster 
Relief, Slovenia
Dušan Fajfar, IGEA
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Strategy
 Integrated IT support for Emergency 
Management 
 Different IS integrated in functional system used by different 
subjects: 
 Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief with Emergency 
centers (112)
 Rescue forces
 Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning
 Municipalities
 Public 
 International activities
 ...
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
 Used in all phases of 
Emergency management
37
Strategy
 Integrated IS – common database
 Each data is entered only once
 Technical solution – central database and
replication of data
 Content (general):
 Rescue units with area of responsibility
 Rescue personnel 
 Action plans
 Hazard maps
 Data about interventions
 GIS - core of the system
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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GIS_UJME
 Development of GIS started in 1996
 Goals:
 different Risk and Hazards Maps bring to common 
system
 underlay with 
cartographic maps
 simple application 
for browsing data 
 Preparation of
cartographic output
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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GIS_UJME  - Risk and Hazard maps
Avalanches 
Fire risk
areas 
Earthquake zones  
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
40
GIS_UJME  - Risk and Hazard maps
Dams
Flood lines
Chemical 
establishments 
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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GIS_UJME - Cartographic data
 Cartographic background (raster) data
 Topographic maps of scale 1:5000 to 1:750.000
 Digital ortophoto 1:5000
 Data provided by Surveying and Mapping Authority of the RS
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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GIS_UJME – Geolocated registers
 Register of teritorial units
 Municipalities, settlements,streets, house number (addresses)
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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 Register of geographical names 
 Register of companies – linked to geolocated addresses
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GIS_UJME – other data
 Environmentaly sensitive areas (protected areas):
 national park, regional park, landscape park, nature 
reserve and natural monuments
 protected forest
 Water data: potable water sources, underground water, 
rivers and lakes with protected areas, etc. 
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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GIS_UJME – other data
 Infrastructure: traffic infrastructure: roads, railways, 
energetic infrastructure: electricity and gas supply, 
telecommunications network, sewage system, water supply 
system, air corridors, etc.
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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 WEB based solution eGIS_UJME is implemented in 2001
 GIS informations to more users
 Desktop aplication primary for Emergency centers
 WEB aplication for
 planers in Administration of the RS for Civil Protection and 
Disaster Relief and in municipalities
 rescue forces
 integrated into system 
for reporting 
on intervention
eGIS_UJME
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eGIS_UJME
 New version of eGIS_UJME in October 2007
 More functionality: spatial analysis, drawing on the map, printing
maps
 More user friendly
 Supporting systems
 GIS_UJME portal; communication with users - news, help, links, 
 Metadata system
 User rights
managment system
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 Rescue forces with area of responsibility (apr. 40 layers) 
 Name, address, contact data (phone, pager, etc.)
 Unit personel with functions, contact data
 Graphical presentation of areas of responsibility (can
depends on type of event)
 Request permanent maintenance of graphical and 
attribute data
BAZIR – Data Managment System
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Action plans
 Action plan = Digital algorithms
 Defined for type of event and area
 3 level index with about 100 events
 Area on different levels
 State
 Regional
 Municipality
 Local (area of territorial fire units) 
 Particular location (tunnels, factories 
with dangerous goods, etc.)
 In action plans actions are defined in general way:
 activate territorial fire brigade
 activate medical help unit
 announce major of municipality
 ...
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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Emergency Response Plans
 Emergency Response Plans exist in paper form
 limited access to materials – need to copy papers
 hard to search
 hard to manage (one data change must be done on more places)
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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Emergency Response Plans
 Digital portal of Emergency Response Plans
 documents transformed to PDF
 each document and supplements exist just once
 some suplements are on-line generated:
 maps (spatial data) from eGIS_UJME
 lists of units or person (atributte data) from CBZIR
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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Dangerous Materials Safety DataSheet
 Internet aplication with data about
 Dangerous Materials
 Resque instruction
 Preventive measures
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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Fire Threat Prediction System
 Daily estimated prediction for nonurban areas
 vegetation, terain, 
 weather data – measurement and prediction for 48 hours (ALADIN)
 automatic dailly takeover of data from Environmental Agency
(Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning)
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
 2 models:
 for Slovenia on level of communities
 for coastal region on 1km grid
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 Mobile weather stations
 Emission estimation
 Dispersion modelling
 Geographical information
system
 On-line pollution impact on 
population
Mobile automatic weather and air
pollution system
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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PROTOTYPE
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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RESULTS: ON-LINE IMPACT ON POPULATION
GIS DATA
IMPACT
Orto foto
Corine land cover
Digital model of 
terrain heights
population
Dispersion
model results
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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Event support – step 1
 Selection of type of event
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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Event support – step 2
 Location of telephone call is presented in GIS
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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Event support – step 2
 Location of telephone call status
 Implemented for fixed telephony - Telekom
 For mobile (GSM) operator Mobitel will be included to 
the end of 2007 (Mobitel covers 80% of SLO users)
 Future
 Including other (2) GSM operators
 VOIP telephony (fixed, mobile ???)
 e-CALL
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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Event support – step 2
 Other ways of finding location of an event
 by address
 manualy by zoom
in/out, pan, ...
 searching other 
data: caves, 
avalanches, ice 
waterfall, ...
 by register of 
business units
 by register of 
geographical 
names
 by coordinates
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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Event support – step 3
 Selection of Action plan
 selection is done automatically in GIS based on location and type
of event
 search on base of coordinates (x,y) is done from low level area to 
top level area (local, municipality, region, state)
 Selection of units responsible in this location 
 From general description to particular unit
 Selection automatically in GIS on the base of areas of 
responsibility
 each type of rescue forces (territorial fire brigade, medical help 
units, municipalities, ...) is represented by GIS layer 
 unit is selected by geographic location (X,Y)
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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Event support – step 4
 List of units and person to activate/annonce
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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Event support - Future
 A new integrated information and communication system is in 
implementation
 Modernization of infrastructure:
 New telephone centrals
 Upgrade of radio communications
 New computers (servers, workstations)
 New integrated SW for Emergency support – 3 displays
 Communication console (telephone, radio, paging, 
alarming, SMS, fax,...)
 Management of intervention (events, action plans, 
resources, ...)
 GIS - existing solution will be integrated
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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Public
Data 
administrators
Planners
Emergency 
center operators
BAZiR
Attribute Data 
Management
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Action Plan 
Management
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Emergency 
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Spatial Data 
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Public 
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Telephone 
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Emergency Incidents 
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Fire Threat 
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Spatial Data 
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CBZIR 
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Event Management
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Spatial Data 
Management
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MOIS
Mobile 
Environmental IS
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Emergency Incident Reporting System
 WEB aplication for report of interventions:
 1st report after 2 hours; prepared by operators from Emergency
centers
 Final report, prepared by leader of intervenition (head of primary
rescue unit)
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
 Integrated with:
 SPU112 - System 
for Emergency
Support – data
source
 eGIS_UJME –
location of event
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Questions !?
Thank you !
NATECH Risk Assessment and Management, 17th of September, 2007, Stresa, Italy
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10.03.2008 1NATECH-Workshop, Stresa, 17-18.09.07, Germany
UBA-Research Project 203 48 362: Establishments and Natural Hazards
NATECH-Workshop, Stresa, 17.09.07
Germany
UBA-Research Project:
Protection of existing and planned establishments and 
installations against hazardous environmental impacts, 
especially flood
by 
Dipl.-Ing. Hanns-Jürgen Warm
Dr. rer. nat. Karl-Erich Köppke
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UBA-Research Project 203 48 362: Establishments and Natural Hazards
1.Background
2.Project Scope
3.Work Programme
4.Results
5.Next steps
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UBA-Research Project 203 48 362: Establishments and Natural Hazards
HF (liquified by cooling)
August 20021. Background:
(Flood in 2002)
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UBA-Research Project 203 48 362: Establishments and Natural Hazards
August 2002
Storm Earthquake
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UBA-Research Project 203 48 362: Establishments and Natural Hazards
1. Natural hazards are linked to the location of a site.
2. Natural hazards may cause several chemical
accidents at the same time.
3. Possibilities of mitigation may be limited.
4. Data for the required risk analysis may be not available
or reliable.
5. Kind and severity of natural hazards may be influenced
by human activities - climate change.
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UBA-Research Project 203 48 362: Establishments and Natural Hazards
2. Project Scope
1. Establishments according to the
Seveso-Directive (96/82/EU)
Î floods, storms, earthquakes
2. installations containing substances 
hazardous to water 
Î floods
3. installations for storage of extremely 
flammable gases in vessels
Î floods
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UBA-Research Project 203 48 362: Establishments and Natural Hazards
3. Work Programme (Floods):
1. an evaluation of the existing legal and technical requirements
2. a survey on the flood risk management at establishments and 
installations in the catchments areas of the Rhine and the Elbe,
3. a description of flood risk mapping approaches
4. a description of available flood protection and safety 
technology 
5. a discussion of emergency planning requirements
6. recommendations
81
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4. Results (Floods):
Types of floods:
1. Insufficient draining
2. Flash floods by creaks
3. Riverine floods
4. Groundwater increase
82
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4. Results (Floods):
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VAwS-installation
 
 
surface water 
public dyke 
dyke breach 
flood plains 
boundary of the 
flood-prone zone 
establishments according 
Major Accidents Ordinance  
industrial 
area 
  liquified gas 
vessel 
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1. Flood protection requirements in technical rules are insufficient
2. Operators of establishments have to protect their sites. 
3. An obligation for that should be added to the MA-Ordinance.
4. This protection should be equivalent to that of the dykes close to the site.
5. Existing recommendations on flood protection of installations in flood plains
have to be made legal requirements.
6. Equivalent obligations need to be defined for flood prone zones.
7. Both types of requirements need to be enforced.
8. Operators of establishments need to consider flood risks in their safety
concepts, safety reports and emergency plans.
9. Guidance should be provided for that.
10. More research is needed on the effects of climate change on 
establishments.
4. Results (Floods):
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HQ100 and higher
HQ50 -
<100
installations with risk potential class D
installations with risk potential class A, B, C, D
classes:           A, B, C, D
increasing risk potential
state-of-the-art of flood protection
HQ <50 
installations with risk potential class B, C, D
4. Results (Floods):
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4. Results (Floods):
position close to a river without 
protection by a public dyke
Position behind public dyke in flood-
prone zones
dyke according DIN 19 712:
Dyke breach can be excluded. Dyke 
overflow has to be regarded.
dyke not according to DIN19 712:
Dyke breach can’t be excluded. All 
hazards have to be regarded.
dyke breach
dyke overflow
flow velocity
floating material
ice
inundation
cross streaming
flow velocity
floating material
ice
warning time sufficient and warning time not sufficient
State-of-the-art by
technical measures, e.g. dry precaution by 
stationary or mobile systems according to the 
estimated water level 
or
management measures, e.g. evacuation of 
hazardous substances
State-of-the-art by
technical measures, e.g. 
- dry precaution by stationary systems 
(mobile systems only partly sufficient)
- wet precaution
additional:
management measures  (alone not sufficient)
establishments
86
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DIN 4149 2005 (earthquakes)
4. Results (storms and earthquakes):
DIN 1055-4 2005 (wind)
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4. Results (storms and earthquakes):
Technical safety deficits:
1. Conceptional difficulties in the evaluation of combined risks, e.g. construction
risk in combination with operational risks due to the presence of hazardous
substances. 
2. Not suitable protection aim of DIN 4149 (Constructions in German earthquake
prone areas) i.e. personal security; in the case of an earthquake considerable
plastic deformations can be tolerated according to DIN 4149, which, however, 
could cause releases in the environment at installations.
3. The favored layout methodology of DIN 4149 is not suitable for installations
(answer response methodology combined with not suitable recommened
safety measures: seismic resilient design of building structures).
4. DIN 1055-4 includes a frequently inappropriate assessment of storm hazards
caused by interferences resulting from the surroundings topology. 
5. DIN 1055-4 does not consider rare effects i.e. tornados, DIN 4149 does not
consider soil liquefraction.
6. Not suitable risk criteria e.g. the design storm in DIN 1055-4 is a storm once in 
50 years.
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4. Results (storms and earthquakes):
Technical safety deficits:
7. DIN 1055-4 and DIN 4149 are therefore not suitable for installations in 
establishments.
8. Load combinations defined by the underlying DIN 1055-100 for the layout of 
structures are not sufficient for industrial installations
(e.g. no combination of snow and storm required).
9. The seismic vulnerability for most establishments and installations located in 
German earthquake prone areas is unkown.
10.A regulation on emergency management requirements
a) after an earthquake
b) in advance, in case and after storms
is missing.
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4. Results (storms and earthquakes):
Safety deficits in the licensing proceedures: 
1. construction standards with different state-of-the-art.  
2. construction safety deficits caused in the issue of environmental permits 
(insufficient consideration of the German building regulations for 
installations). 
3. systemic safety deficits in the licensing procedure according to BImSchG
like missing consideration of the official expertises on construction safety in 
the official expertises on installation safety as well as the safety reports 
according to the Major Accidents Ordinance.
4. insufficient knowledge about protection aims and construction standards in 
the frame of BImSchG permissions, especially relevant for establishments 
according to the Major Accidents Ordinance.
5. insufficient information exchange between process engineers and civil 
engineers during the planning and examination process for installations 
and establishments. 
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4. Results (storms and earthquakes):
Plastical
deformation is
allowed for the
adsorption of energy
Soil liquefraction on wet sediments
which are considered as low risk
ground in DIN 4149
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Air liquefaction plant in an 
earthquake prone zone
The tower was considered as 
„installation“ and not as „building“:
Î No check of the structural
design in the licensing proceedure!
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1. Research project on the fundamentals for a Technical Rule „Wind 
and Earthquakes“ for establishments
(2008 – 2009)
2. Guidance for safety concepts, safety reports and emergency
plans for the consideration of floods, storms and earthquakes
3. Research project on the possible effects of climate change on 
establishments (???)
4. Resarch project on seismic resilient design and construction of 
installations (???)
5. Next steps (?):
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Thank you 
for your attention!
Roland Fendler
roland.fendler@uba.de
www.umweltbundesamt.de
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Natural Disasters – External Hazard 
Sources for Major Accident Sites in 
Austria
Michael Struckl
Federal Ministry for Economics and Labour, Austria
NATECH Workshop
Stresa, Italy, September 2007ber 17 - 18
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JRC Natech Workshop 2
Situation
• 134 industrial sites with major accident potential
• Major accident potential defined by the EU –
Seveso II – Directive (exceeding thresholds of 
hazardous substances)
• Various permit procedures (environmental, 
planning, industrial etc.)
• Specific requirement from Seveso II: „take all 
necessary measures“ – demonstrated by a safety 
report (or similar document)
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External Hazard
Sources
• Tradition of compliance with Seveso since 1991
• „External hazard sources“ shall be taken into 
account
• External hazard sources:
¾ Neighbouring establishments
¾ Traffic infrastructure in the vicinity
¾ Cut of public supply (electricity, gas, water etc.)
¾ Natural hazard sources
¾ No external hazard sources: intentional acts
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Specific Sources
• Floods
• Lightning
• Earthquakes
• Loads (wind, snow)
• Avalanches
• Landslides, sudden surface change
98
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Assessment
• Avalanches: no relevance (no sites in possibly 
affected areas)
• Loads: taken into account in building codes 
(deterministic procedure – predefined values)
• Lightning: appropriate protection measures defined 
deterministically; no site-specific, only technology-
specific assessment
• Land slides, surface changes: brief qualitative 
assessment (no old mining area, no other 
indicators)
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Assessment (2)
• Earthquakes: 3 regions with higher earthquake 
likelihood, theoretically it should be considered 
specifically, in practice assumption that there is 
sufficient protection by building codes
• Floods: most relevant source, many sites in flood 
areas of Austrian rivers or in potential “flash-flood”
areas of creeks in mountain areas – but during the 
recent floods in 2003, 2005 and 2007 no damage 
with severe consequences
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Assessment (3)
• Floods: Only hazard type with explicit quantitative 
assessment
• Legislation defines 10-2 – events as borderline for 
“normal” flood protection (requires land use 
planning restrictions, dam measures etc.)
• Most industrial major hazard sites are well beyond, 
safety reports indicate a 10-4 – flood to represent a 
concern, more likely floods do not pose a risk 
(because of the actual siting or existing measures)
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Summary
• Tradition in Austria of quantitative assessment 
only in flood protection
• Other natural hazard sources: “hidden”
quantitative assessment in building codes, load 
assumptions or protection measures defined 
deterministically combined with precautionary 
principle
• Quantitative risk communication avoided –
legislation/jurisdiction want “fixed” values defined 
by law (like in the case of flood protection)
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LESSONS LEARNT 
FOLLOWING NATECH 
EVENTS IN ROMANIA DUE 
TO CLIMATIC CHANGES
Prof. dr.ing. Alexandru OZUNU
Prof. dr. Serban VLAD
Septimiu MARA
Babes-Bolyai University
Cluj-Napoca, Romania
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Foods: April, 2005108
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Impact of the climate change over 
the hydro-meteorological regime in 
Romania over the last years
 Extreme rainfalls of 70-200 l/m2, in many places 
around Romania;
 Extreme rainfalls over a long period of time (2-
3 days);
 Dams and ponds failure due to high water 
pressure;
 Snow melt over a short period of time due to 
climate warming.
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National level consequences
 35 counties affected by floods 
 882 towns and villages flooded
 76 deceases 
 Aprox. 13500 persons evacuated
 More then 38000 households were affected, (3500 
distroyed)
 590500 hectars (5900 square kilometers) flooded 
 540 km national roads, 980 km county roads and
1200 km streets flooded
 More then 50 km railways affected
 1400 bridges affected, of which 34 were distroyed
 1,8-2 billions EURO estimated losses110
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Major hazards for NATECH 
events in Romania
 Natural:
– Landslides, mudflows and falls
– Avalanches
– Erosion
– Flash floods
– Floods
• Complex:
– Earthquake induced hazards
111
9/17/2007 NATECH WS, Hotel Bristol 10
112
9/17/2007 NATECH WS, Hotel Bristol 11
CASE STUDY 1
Tarnicioara tailing dam
27.06. - 02.07.2006 - Heavy rainfall led to 
torrential flows on the slopes surrounding the 
Tarnicioara tailing dam 
As a result of the heavy rainfall, due to the 
accumulation of the excess water from the nearby 
creek, a reservoir of 12 m water deep formed on
the top of the tailing dam, which by the strong gust 
of wind that accompanied the rain storm, started to
batter the tailing dam crest, being in danger to
overflow and leading to a disaster to the
downstream village, Ostra.
113
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Localisation of the Tarnicioara tailing dam and the downstream village Ostra, in 
Suceava county, Romania114
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 treat on the almost 
5000 people located 
nearly 3km 
downstream, in the 
village of Ostra. 
 an imminent 
collapse of the dam 
could significantly 
worsened the 
environmental 
conditions, because 
of the presence of 
the heavy metals.
The torrential flows on the slopes 
of the Scaldatori creek 
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Response actions
 6 special pumps of ANIF 
(National Agency for Land 
Reclamation) were put in 
place, with a discharge 
over 1100 cm/h 
 a higher capacity pump 
was brought (1600 mc/h) 
from a coal mining, 
specialized for removal of 
increased water levels
 three additional pipes 
were installed upstream of 
the diverting gallery, in 
order to diminish the 
inflow in the tailing dam, 
working at their entire 
discharging capacity.
Special pumps 
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Lessons learnt
 Implementation of the Aquis communitaire is 
necessary 
 Appropriate risk assessment and management is 
required to assure safe exploitation and 
operation of mine waste tailings dams
 The obligations of dam owners and operators
must be defined so that they can be operated 
safely and so that adequate measures can be 
taken to reduce the risks of an accident 
 Proper monitoring systems must be in place to 
assess structural performance
117
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CASE STUDY 2
Tornado type storm at Facaeni
 on 12 August 2002, at around 19:30 a violent 
storm affected the Facaeni village:
 two persons lost their lives because their house 
collapsed, 
 14 persons were seriously wounded, 
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Damages of the high 
voltage power lines in 
the area.
 the storm blocked the 
railways traffic in the 
region because of the 
trees that had 
collapsed over the high 
tension polls,
 trees were uprooted 
and important surfaces 
of plots of land has 
been affected as well, 
 a totally of 15 houses 
was razed from the 
surface of the earth 
while another 300 
remained without a 
roof. 119
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Response phase
 The interdiction in the area of the vehicles and 
unauthorised persons and the guide of the traffic on 
other devious rotes, until the clearance  of the main 
road by the crushed vehicles, pillars and electric 
lines damaged, the fallen trees and branches.
 The National Society of Red Cross sent a 
humanitarian aid by emergency to the homeless 
affected people, consisting of about 22000 EURO 
and shelters, materials and food supply, being 
dispatched in less than an hour 24 persons. The aid 
given permitted the accommodation of the 
homeless people and the assurance by prime 
emergency of their survival.
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Lessons learnt
 The installation of the warning-alerting systems 
of the population in the areas with increased risk 
of producing the natural disasters is necessary. 
 The citizens have the following obligations:
 to participate at training in order to assimilate the 
necessary knowledge in the field of Civil 
Protection activity;
 to respect the rules and protection measures 
against the disasters.
 The implementation of the system of the 
damages indemnity in case of disaster through 
the assurance societies is necessary 121
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CASE STUDY 3
Ocnele Mari – underground salt mining 
collapse
 Causes:
 overexploitation
by water
injection since
1960, 
 the
underground
accumulations
of brine.
Rm Valcea
Reservoir
Raureni 
Reservoir
Govora reservoir
Babeni reservoir
Ocnele Mari - 
salt lake cavern
Copacelu Village
Raureni 
bridge
Copacelu
 bridge
Bistrita creek
Olanesti creekSarat creek
Topolog creek
DA Intake
Oltchim intake
Caustic Soda
factory-
intake
Industrial Water 
intakes0 100 m
Scale
Olt
River
N
brineoutflow
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 the roof of the cavern 
collapsed, 
 the excess of the salted 
water located 
underground, flowed 
down to a nearby creek 
(Salted creek) and 
afterwards reached Olt
river. 
 the outflow of brine 
water severely polluted 
the downstream water 
reservoirs of the Olt
river 123
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 Following the first 
event, in the year to 
follow many other 
collapses, triggered 
by the extreme 
weather conditions 
with increased rain 
over the affected 
area, finally formed a 
large crater area, 
filled with a salt lake 
with a total surface of 
3000 sq. m, and 
diameter of 80m. 124
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Measures taken
 the continuos surveillance of the endangered 
zone;
 the resettlement of the affected households and 
peoples;
 construction of a retention dam, with almost 
80.000 c.m. for the brine in order to don’t reach 
directly the Olt River;
 clean up of the affected area by the spilling 
brine.
125
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GENERAL LESSONS LEARNT
Efficient informational method of reducing 
and preventing several types of hazards
 To be effective, measures have to be 
taken by the local public administration to 
make such information available.
 Recommendations should be made to the 
local and regional administration 
authorities involved in natural disaster 
management
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 A proper endowment with automatic 
meteorological stations, using the latest 
advanced technologies is necessary 
 It is necessary the insurance of all the goods 
and properties in the areas prone to natural 
disasters
 Develop a detailed analysis of the potential 
consequences and damage distances for 
possible scenarios of NATECH accidents
 Develop and maintain a good information 
system on the risks of natural and 
technological disasters
127
9/17/2007 NATECH WS, Hotel Bristol 26
At the local level (1)
 Reduce or prevent disasters caused by 
extreme meteorological phenomena, such as 
floods, and accidental pollution; 
 Improve speed and accuracy of flood 
prediction; 
 Improve speed and reliability of emergency 
response; 
 Reduce potential risks and damages; 
 Disseminate lessons learned and results via 
the Internet for easy access;128
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At the local level (2)
 Develop a system to warn potentially affected 
people; 
 Use simulations to assess emergency action 
plans; 
 Develop what-if scenarios and emergency 
action plans for potential accidental releases 
from mining or industrial operations; 
 Disseminate and communicate accurate, 
timely, locally relevant, and reliable 
assessments of risk.
129
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THANK YOU!
aozunu@enviro.ubbcluj.ro
Ozunu_al@yahoo.com
+40 744 768561
130
SOME ASPECTS 
OF THE NATECH RISK 
MANAGEMENT IN POLAND
Sławomir Zając
National HQ of the State Fire Service
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THE MOST TYPICAL DISASTERS 
IN POLAND
 FLOODS
 FIRES
 TRANSPORT OF DENGEROUS GOODS 
BY ROADS AND RAILWAYS
132
FLOODS CAN BE EFFECTS OF 
RAINFALLS, THAWS AND STORMS
To assess a flood hazard:
provide a data given from meteorology stations, 
concerning hydrological data, flow states, temperatures 
and total number of rainfalls.
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FOREST FIRES
 There is a special assessment methodologies 
of determination of fire hazard category of 
forests, regarding type of forest stand, age, 
number of fires, number of rainfalls and 
average temperatures, fire hazard index, 
concerning especially duff humidity, relative 
air humidity and rainfall ratio. 
 A methodology of risk assessment for forest 
fires is given by the ordinance of Minister of 
Environment of 22 March 2006 on detailed 
requirements considering fire protection of 
forests (OJ. No 58, pos. 405).
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NATURAL DISASTERS
 FLOODS
 RAIN STORMS
 STRONG WINDS
 DROUGHT WITH FIRES
 STRONG FROST AND SNOWSTORM
 EARTHQUAKES, LOW MAGNITUDE
135
The area of Poland is rated among
low seismic hazard district:
a) earthquakes occur hardly ever, 
b) tremors are not very strong.
The areas of Karpaty and Sudety 
mountains = higher seismic risk
zones
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OBSERVATORIES = MONITORING
Activities:
 Study of local
earthquakes.
 Observation of large
distant earthquakes
and reporting the data 
to international
seismological centres.
 Information on our
observatories and
stations.
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TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS
RELATED TO:
 THE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION,
 STORAGE OF DANGEROUS GOODS,
 FAILURE OF TRANSPORTING DANGEROUS 
GOODS BY ROADS 
AND RAILWAYS,
 MAJOR HAZARD ACCIDENTS
 CHEMICAL/RADIOLOGICAL SUBSTANCES
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•INDUSTRAIL PRODUCTION
•MAJOR HAZARD ACCIDENT
•STORAGE OF DANGEROUS GOODS
•FAILURE OF TRANSPORTING 
DANGEROUS GOODS
•NBRC SUBSTANCES
TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTER
•FIRES
•FLOODS
•HURRICANES
•SNOW STORMS
•EARTHQUAKES
•VULCAO
•TSUNAMI
NATURAL 
CALAMITIES
NATECH DISASTER
SIGNIFICANT 
ADVERSE 
EFFECTS TO 
THE HEALTH OF 
PEOPLE, 
PROPERTY AND 
ENVIRONMENT
RISK TO REGIONS WHICH ARE  
UNPREPARED FOR SUCH EVENTS
139
DIRECTIVE 96/82/EC (SEVESO II)
 FLOODS
 FIRES (ESPECIALLY FOREST FIRES)
 STRONG WINDS
RISK ASSESMENT AS A CONCEQUECES OF 
NATURAL CALAMITIES
140
SEVESO II PLANTS IN POLAND
(31.12.2006 )
Art. 9 156
Art. 6, 7 197
12
23
5
2
9
7
14
14
3
5
9
614
10
10
19
10
9
10
31
4
16
16
19
10
8
5
6
13
10
12
12
Total 353 141
The National Rescue and Fire-fighting System 
is organized by the State Fire Service,
and it main task is protection of life of citizens, 
properties and environment
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The National Rescue
and Fire-fighting System
for protection of life , health, property and environment
• fighting against fires and NATURAL DISASTERS (e. g. FLOODS),
• technical rescue,
• chemical and ecological rescue,
• medical rescue,
• international rescue assistance.
• preparing and conducting rescue operations ,
• warning and alarming population,
• carrying out evacuation of population,
• supplying people with individual protection resources,
• preparing places of residence for injured,
• international humanitarian assistance,
has duties, which are very crucial to the society, in particular :
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The National Rescue
and Fire-fighting System
operates on three Administrative Levels Coresponding with
Administrative Structure of the Country
• PROVINCIAL – coordination and assistance to the rescue operations when
resources in the district are insufficient,
• CENTRAL – rescue operations` assistance and cooperation when resources in
the province are insufficient.
• DISTRICT – main executive level, where are carried out basic tasks on the
area of district,
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 THE NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 
OF THE STATE FIRE SERVICE 
PROVINCIAL
HEADQUARTERS
SFS 
16 
RESCUE & FIRE-
FIGHTING UNITS
SFS 
508 
THE MAIN 
SCHOOL OF 
FIRE SERVICE 
OTHER 
SCHOOLS 
SFS 
 
THE RESEARCH 
CENTER OF FIRE 
PROTECTION 
DISTRICT
HEADQUARTERS
SFS 
335 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF SFS
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Main tasks of the State Fire Service
 recognition of fire hazards and other local threats,
 organisation and leading rescue operations 
during fires, natural calamities or mitigation of 
local threats,
 supporting other rescue services in rescue 
operations during natural calamities and 
mitigation of local threats,
 supervision of observing fire safety regulations,
 control of activities preventing major hazard 
accidents.
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SFS PREVENTION ACTIVITIES
SEVESO II DIRECTIVE SCOPE
 Notification,
 Major – accident prevention 
programmes,
 Safety reports
 Internal & External emergency plans
 Public information process
 Domino effect
 Inspections
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SFS – SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT 
THREATS (1/2)
 Inspections on conformity with fire regulations 
at buildings and other premises,
 Information given by fire protection experts 
about the acceptance of newly designed 
buildings,
 Carried out identification of technical, chemical 
and ecological hazards in selected plants,
 Carried out training exercises,
148
SFS – SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT 
THREATS (2/2)
 Submitted for acceptance rescue plans of 
industrial plants using hazardous materials, 
which can cause extraordinary hazard to 
environment
 Monitoring systems, e.g. radiation, water, fire,
 Information given by other bodies which deal 
with various types of threats, e.g. environmental 
inspection, labour inspection, sanitary inspection, 
institute of meteorology and  water management,
 Register of accidents.
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The SFS has organised two main 
data bases:
 a register of accidents which have 
dealt by rescue services (mainly by 
the SFS and voluntary fire brigades),
 a catalogue of hazards.
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CATALOGUE OF HAZARD
 A list of industrial plants using 
dangerous substances,
 A list of transport roads of dangerous 
goods,
 A list of objects can be in disaster 
danger especially,
 Data of flooding hazards.
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THANK YOU 
FOR YOUR 
ATTENTION
152
10/03/2008 1
Boyko Ranguelov 
Geophysical Institute, 
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences 
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THREATS  ANALISYS
THREATS  OF   THE   GREATEST IMPORTANCE   FOR  THE  
NATECH  DISASTER  RISK in Bulgaria:
1. EARTHQUAKES (NO SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OCURRED 
DURING THIS TIME PERIOD)
(THIS  THREAT  IS  THE  HIGHEST  PRIORITY  FOR  THE  
TERRITORY  OF  THE  COUNTRY)
2.   FLOODS (HEAVY FLOODS DURING 2005)
3.   LANDSLIDES (SEVERAL ACTIVATED NOT OF GREAT 
IMPORTANCE)
4.  FOREST FIRES (THE MOST MASSIVE DURING THE FIRST 
HALF OF 2007)
5. OTHER  THREATS THAT COULD BE A  TRIGGERING  
FACTOR  FOR   A  NATECH  EVENT
154
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The new governmental policy since 
2004
LEGISLATION
NEW LOW ABOUT THE CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT
ESTABLISHMENT OF A 
NEW MINISTRY OF THE 
STATE POLICY FOR 
DISASTERS AND 
ACCIDENTS -
www.mdpba.governme
nt.bg/ - Minister
Mrs. Emel Etem
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OTHER INSTITUTIONS RELATED 
TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
GOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION ABOUT PEOPLE 
PROTECTION RROM DISASTERS AND ACCIDENTS to CM
CIVIL PROTECTION AGENCY
www.cp.mdpba.government.bg/
Ministry of Interior - www.mvr.bg (Fire brigades -
http://www.nspbzn.mvr.bg/ )
Ministry of environment and waters
http://www.moew.government.bg/ - Wastes and pollution
Ministry of regional development www.mrrb.government.bg/
Scientific support – (Centre of research to the national 
security) 
National statistics - www.nsi.bg156
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CRISIS MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
DEVELOPED 
Emergency phone 112 (up to now works 
only for Sofia district)
National crisis management centre (not 
yet in operation)
Regional crises management centers (not 
yet in operation)
Center for aero and space observations (in 
operation since 1st August, 2007)
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І – VІ І – VІІ І – VІІІ І- ІХ
Seismic coefficient Кc
Кc=0,05 Кc= 0,10 Кc= 0,15 Кc= 0,27
Seismic regions in Bulgaria– THE 
LAST(ОLD) VERSION (1987) OF 
SEISMIC ZONING
Intensity degree
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SEISMIC REGIONS IN EUROPA
EUROCODE8 -Strictly 
defines the seismic
regions where 
occurrence of 
earthquakes of different 
expected accelerations 
are possible.
STANDARDS FOR DESIGN OF NEW BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES
IN EARTHQUAKE PRONE REGIONS ACCORDING EUROCODE 8 
(NOT YET IMPLEMENTED)
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2. THREAT  OF  FLOODS
FLOODS FROM QUICK SNOWS  MELTING 
AND  HEAVY  RAINS (FLASH FLOODS)
SPRING FLOODS ALONG  THE  DANUBE  
RIVER – HIGH   WATER   LEVELS  
160
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Floods in Bulgaria - 2005
¾ of the country territory flooded during several 
episodes (May, August, September)
Damages over 900 MEURO
More then several hundreds NATECHs occurred 
– road and railway interruptions, electric lines 
damaged, gas pipe line stops, etc. 
Rescue operations and evacuations performed
Recovery work – army included
Risk mapping surprise
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Floods – 2005 – Belovo city –
railroad, electric line, bridge, road
162
1110/03/2008
Floods – 2005-2006 – the Danube river
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1210/03/2008
Railroads damages after 4-6th
August, 2005 floods
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1310/03/2008
Floods 2005 - Map of the transportation 
system interruptions  -yellow (X’s) and 
landslides (blue areas)
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Risk and vulnerability mapping
Hazards mapping
Vulnerability mapping
Risk mapping
Multirisk mapping 
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1510/03/2008
Map of the miltihazards – floods 
and landslides (2-5 levels)
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1610/03/2008
Vulnerability map (considering , 
density of the population, 
unemployment and poverty)
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1710/03/2008
Risk map – levels 5-9
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1810/03/2008
NEW FLOODS ZONATION MAP –
G. Alexiev (2007-Tender with JRC
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3. THREAT  OF  LANDSLIDES
 HUNDREDS  OF  LANDSLIDES  AND  ABRASIVE 
REGIONS  ARE  REGISTERED.
 A  GREATER  PART  OF  THEM  ARE  ACTIVE.
 350  OF  THEM  ARE  SITUATED  IN  BUILD-UP  AREAS 
AND  HEALTH  RESORTS.
 THEY  ARE  SPREAD  ON  A  TERRITORY  OF  20 000 ha.
 USUALLY  THEY  ARE  ACTIVATED   WHEN  THE  LAND 
LAYERS  ARE  HEAVILY  MOISTENED  OR  AS  A  RESULT 
OF  EARTHQUAKES.
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NEW LANDSLIDE  ZONING MAP –
G. Alexiev 2007– Tender JRC
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Analysis and measures
Not existing up to the moment (2005) flood 
hazard map
The average statistics is non applicable to the 
extreme cases as these ones of 2005
The river beds must be clear (as a post event 
and at the same time – as preventive measure)
Local authorities are first involved in the rescue 
operations and evacuation (no very big success)
The recovery funds must be controlled strictly 
The early warning issues are not effective 
without supporting measures 
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Forest Fires (Wildfires) - 2007 
More than 300 000 ha fired
More than 300 MEURO damages
No effective tools (planes, helicopters, etc.) for 
fight against large burning areas and heavy 
access 
No working models about fast assessment of the 
fire time and space development scenarios
Several NATECH’s generated as: electric lines 
interruptions, some explosions of old military 
explosives, road interruptions, etc.  
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Wildfires July 2007
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Some statistics – fires 2004 (left) 
and 2005 (right) 
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2510/03/2008
Time distribution of the forest fires 1971-
2006 on the territory of Bulgaria (left) and 
the number for 2001-2006 (right)
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2610/03/2008
Map of the observed forest fires 
during the time period 1994-2006
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Analysis and measures
No effective tools are available to fight fires on 
large areas and in heavy access cases – plans 
to supply the fire brigades with special airplanes 
and helicopters
No effective models for fire development in time 
and space – plans to incorporate land and space 
information about such purposes 
No effective coordination with the volunteers
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OTHER  THREATS  WHICH  ON  RARE
OCCASIONS  CAN  BE  A  TRIGGERING  
FACTOR  FOR  A  NATECH   EVENT
STRONG  WINDS
Rain, snow, hail, dust (rare)
They  are  able to disturb  electricity  and communication  links.
HEAVY  SNOWFALLS,  SNOW  STORMS, 
ICE/FROST
Yearly  about  50÷60%  of  the  country  is  endangered  by 
snowdrifts. Every year NE Bulgaria (in general) has electric 
interruptions due to the wire icing 
FIRES
They  can  be  a  triggering  factor  for  a natech  event  at sites  of  
plants  and  enterprises  with  technological installations  and
equipments  on  them  operating  with  dangerous chemical  
substances.
4.
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National statistics of the natural 
hazards – 2004 (left), 2005 (right) 
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I.   NATECH  RISK  ASSESSMENT (“OLD AND 
NEW” (X) – after the accession) APPROACHES
 EACH   BRANCH   OF   NATIONAL   ECONOMY   HAS METHODOLOGIES   AND   
INSTRUCTIONS   FOR TECHNOLOGICAL   RISK   ASSESSMENT. (“OLD CODES 
AND RULES)
X NEW APPROACH IS APLYED ACCORDING THE EC DIRECTIVES
 THEY   CONCERNED   ONLY   TECHNOLOGICAL   RISK   WITHOUT  TAKING
INTO   ACCOUNT   THE   NATURAL  DISASTER  TRIGGERING  FACTOR.(“OLD”)
X NOW THE NATURAL HAZATRDS MUST BE ASSESSED AS WELL AS (EXAMPLES 
– NPP’s, DYKES, PLANTS WORKING WITH DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES, ETC.)
 FOR   ALL   SITES   WITH   DANGEROUS   PROCESSES,   AN INDIVIDUAL   
NATECH   RISK   ASSESSMENT   IS   DONE   ON  BASE  OF:
- METHODOLOGIES   AND   INSTRUCTIONS   FOR         
TECHNOLOGICAL   RISK   ASSESSMENT
- EXAMINATION  OF   THE  EXPERIENCE   GATHERED 
AS   A   RESULT   OF DIFFERENT  ACCIDENTS  
X STARTS TO TAKE INTOACCOUNT THE SEVESOII  DIRECTIVE 
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LOCATION  OF  SITES  WITH  DANGEROUS  PROCESSES
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NATECH   RISK   ASSESSMENT   DEPENDS   ON:
A. SITE   LOCATION
 EACH   SITE  LOCATION   HAS   ITS   PARTICULAR   DATA BASE 
CONCERNING:
- SEISMICITY
- FLOODS
- LANDSLIDES 
( - NOW STORMS AND FIRE PROTECTION ARE INCLUDED)
 TO  CREATE THIS  DATA BASE,   USUALLY  THE   GENERAL MAIN   
INFORMATION   ABOUT  THE   TERRITORY  OF   THE   COUNTRY IS 
USED. 
(NOW – NEEDS UPDATE)
 IN  SOME  CASES ADDITIONAL  INFORMATION   IS   NECESSARY 
ABOUT:
- MICROSEISMIC   ZONING   OF   THE   SITE
- HYDROLOGICAL   PROSPECTS AND ZONING
- GEOLOGICAL   PROSPECTS AND ZONING
(NOW – MULTIRISK MAPPING IS CONSIDERED IMPORTANT) 
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NATECH  RISK   ASSESSMENT   DEPENDS   ON:
 SOME ADDITIONAL   FACTORS   RESULTED   BY   PRODUCTION 
PROCESSES,  WHICH   HAVE   THEIR   INFLUENCE   AND  WHICH  
ARE   TAKEN   INTO  ACCOUNT,  ARE:
- WEAR   OF   THE   DIFFERENT   KINDS   OF   ELEMENTS
- CORROSION
- CONSTRUCTIVE   CHANGES   OF   THE   STRUCTURES  
- SUBSTITUTION   OF   SOME   CONSTRUCTIVE   ELEMENTS
- PROHIBITIVE OR   SUSTAINED   OVERLOAD
B. RESULTS  OF   THE INVESTIGATIONS OF   THE   GENERAL   AND  
SEISMIC    STABILITY   OF   BUILDINGS,   FACILITIES   AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL   EQUIPMENTS
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NATECH   RISK   ASSESSMENT   DEPENDS   ON:
C. PROGNOSIS FOR   THE   NATURAL   DISASTER
OCCURRANCES   ACCORDING   TO   THE   
EXPECTATIONS.
D. SCENARIOS OF  THE   TECHNOLOGICAL   DISASTER  
TRIGGERING.
E. NEW METHODOLOGIES DEVELOPMENT AND 
APPLICATION
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SITES   FOR   WHICH  THE  NATECH  RISK  
ASSESSMENT  HAS BEEN DONE:
1. THE NUCLEAR   ELECTRIC   POWER   PLANT   AT   THE   TOWN   
OF   KOZLODUI
( FOR   THE  WHOLE   SITE   AND   IN   PARTICULAR   FOR   EACH 
ONE  OF  THE  TWO  (NOW IN OPERATION)   UNITS
2. HYDROTECHNICAL  FACILITIES
- DAMS  - 215  ITEMS
- EMBARNKMENTS:
- ALONG  DANUBE  RIVER         - 295  KM.  - 15%
- OTHER  BASINS  FOR  WASTE  DEPOSITS  - 72  ITEMS
3. HIGH VOLTAGE   POWER  TRANSMISSION   LINES   OF   THE  
INTEGRATED   ELECTRIC  POWER  SUPPLY  SYSTEM,  
AS  IT  FOLLOWS:
- 750  VOLTAGE  - 85  KM.
- 400  VOLTAGE  - 1 852  KM.
4. LINES  OF  THE  MAIN  GAS-PIPE  LINES TRANSMISSION  SYSTEM
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TRANSMISSION  LINES  OF  THE  
INTEGRATED
ELECTRIC  POWER  SUPPLY  SYSTEM
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MAIN  GAS PIPE- LINES  THE  TERRITORY  OF  BULGARIA
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SITES   FOR   WHICH  THE  NATECH  RISK  
ASSESSMENT HAS BEEN MADE:
5. PLANTS  AND  ENTERPRISES   WITH   TECHNOLOGICAL   INSTALATIONS  
AND  EQUIPMENTS,   OPERATING   WITH   DANGEROUS   CHEMICAL  
PRODUCTS – ABOUT 20 ITEMS
IN  THIS  NUMBER  INCLUDED PLANTS  OF :
- CHEMICAL  INDUSTRY 7 items
- CHEMICAL  PHARMACEUTICS  INDUSTRY 4 items
- CHEMICAL   PERFUMERY  INDUSTRY 2 items
- OIL  MANUFACTURING  INDUSTRY 2 items
- METALLURGICAL  INDUSTRY 2 items
- ORE  OUTPUT  AND  PROCESSING  INDUSTRY 2 items
- ELECTRONICS 1 item
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HIGH RISK DANGEROUS  INSTALATIONS (incl. SEVESO II)
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II. PREVENTION  AND  MITIGATION 
MEASURES  WITH  REGARD  TO  
POTENTIAL  NATECH  CONSEQUENCES
 LEGISLATIVE  STANDARDS  FOR  CIVIL  PROTECTION ARE   
OBLIGATORY
X – NOW THE NEW LEGISLATION IS HARMONISED WITH THE EC 
REQUIREMENTS
 THIS  STANDARTS  PROVIDE  A  STEADY  FUNCTIONING  OF  THE 
NATIONAL  ECONOMY  DURING  THE  CASES  OF  CRISIS  
SITUATIONS
X – NOW THE SAFETY OF POPULATION IS HIGHLY REQUIRED
 A  SPECIAL  PART  OF  THE  STANDARTS  ARE :  
“ENGINEERING  AND  TECHNICAL  NORMS  FOR  CIVIL  PROTECTION”
X - NOW  THE DIRCTIVES OF EC ARE INCORPORATED
192
4110/03/2008
‘”ENGINEERING  AND  TECHNICAL  NORMS  FOR  CIVIL  PROTECTION”
ARE  DIVIDED  IN  GENERAL  AS  FOLLOWS:
1.   GENERAL   PRINCIPLES.
2.   NORMS  FOR  SETTLEMENTS,  PLANTS  AND  FACILITIES,  SETTING UP.
- SETTLEMENTS  PLANNING.
- LOCATION  OF  PLANTS,  ENTERPRISES,  STORES,  BASIS 
AND  OTHER  PROJECTS.
3.   BUILDINGS  AND   FACILITIES.
4.   FACILITIES  FOR  CIVIL  PROTECTION.
5.   WATERSUPPLY  SYSTEM  AND  HYDROTECHNICAL  EQUIPMENTS.
6.   ELECTRICITY  SUPPLY.
7.   MAIN  GAS-PIPE   LINES,  OIL CONDUITS   AND   PIPE  LINES  FOR
STUFFS.
8.   RAILWAY  SYSTEM  AND  ROADS.
9.   TRANSMISSION   AND   RADIO   TRANSMIT   RELAY   SYSTEM.
10. FORMING   AND   MAKING  UP  DOCUMENTATIONS  OF  DESIGNES  AND   
THEIR  CO-ORDINATION   WITH  THE  CIVIL  PROTECTION  AUTHORITIES.
II. PREVENTION  AND   MITIGATION  MEASURES   WITH 
REGARD   TO   POTENTIAL   NATECH   CONSEQUENCES
193
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What is considered NATECHs for the 
last 5 years?
Roads interruptions – more than several tens 
(from floods, landslides, forest fires)
Railroads interruptions – several tens (floods, 
landslides)
Electric lines interruptions – several hundreds –
from storms, icing, (including one blackout –
from  forest fire)
Gas pipe line stops - several from floods and 
landslides (including one blast)
194
4310/03/2008
One real NATECH case from 2007, 
6th August
Gas pipe line blast near village 
Bulgarchevo – Southwest Bulgaria, due to 
the landslide
(Diameter ~ 20 meters, depth ~2 meters)
About 30 hours gas supply to Greece 
interrupted
More then 200 000 lv.(100 000 EUR) 
rehabilitation works
No compensations paid due to the natural 
“unpredictable” circumstances 195
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The real case from 2007, 6th August (gas 
pipe line blast, due to the landslide)
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CONCLUSIONS (“positive”)
NO MAJOR NATECH EVENTS HAVE BEEN 
OBSERVED IN BULGARIA DURING THE LAST 
5 YEARS. NO VICTIMS REPORTED.
A LOT OF SMALLER ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN 
OBSERVED DURING THE FLOODS (2005) 
AND FIRES (2006-2007), BUT WITHOUT 
HEAVY CONSEQUENCES
THE NEW GOVERNMENTAL POLICY IS 
SUCCESSFUL, BUT NEEDS CLARIFICATION 
ABOUT CRISIS CENTRALIZED OR NON 
CENTRALIZED SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
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Conclusions (“negative”)
Difficult coordination between the different 
institutions responsible about different NATECH –
Ministry of environment and Ministry of emergency 
(in case of dangerous substances release), fire 
brigades and civil defense (in case of wildfires), 
volunteers (in case of floods and fires), etc.
Duplication of some functions about rescue and 
emergency measures – Army, Civil Defense, Fire 
Brigades, Volunteers
No effective prevention in case of fires and floods.
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Thank you for your attention!
199
WORKSHOP
“NATECH RISK 
ASSESSMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT”
SEPTEMBER 17-18, 2007 
Stresa, Italy
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LAND USE 
PLANNING 
in NATECH RISK
MANAGEMENT.
THE CASE OF REECE
Anna Papachatzi 
Architect , MSc in Urban and Regional Planning
Greece, Region of Attica, 
Directorate of Environment and Regional Planning
201
Unplanned urbanization___ High 
population density___    Illegal 
constructions ___Out of plan land 
development___   Proximity of 
incompatible uses and mutually 
conflicting interests…
Parkeharrison, Reclamation, 2003
PRIVATE-INDIVIDUAL BUILDING 
DEVELOPMENT
is not the
void 
L      
A
N
D
between the scattered urban entities, 
but a field that integrates the different 
clusters into a dynamic system.
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Parkeharrison, The marks we make, 2003
Lack of dynamic 
monitoring - assessment of 
spatial development 
trends.
Lack of concerted action in 
between the different levels of 
administrative competences 
for spatial planning; 
also between the latter and 
civil protection.
Lack of multi/inter-disciplinary teamwork 
and interrelated competences.
Any 
Luck???
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TERRA
TERRORISMA
We have reached 
an era where
confronts 
a new kind of
Parkeharrison, Earth coat, 2002
EMERGING UNCERTAINTIES
about CONTEMPORARY RISKS
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Has nature of risks 
changed?
Has the number of  
risks increased?
Has urban (physical, 
social, institutional) 
vulnerability 
increased?
New risks in the same 
society ?
New threats in the 
same framework
… or vice versa?
Parkeharrison, Forest bed, 1998
EMERGING UNCERTAINTIES
about CONTEMPORARY RISKS
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Communities don’t 
cope with “familiar”, 
simple, low range  
risks.
Risk management 
occurs only within 
the context of crisis 
management and not 
as a routine action.
Parkeharrison, Tethered sky, 2003
EMERGING UNCERTAINTIES
about CONTEMPORARY RISKS
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In contemporary 
greek reality
the natural, cultural, 
industrial, 
technological 
environments cannot 
be separated 
being all 
parts of an 
integrated 
human/social 
structure.
Chema Madoz
EMERGING UNCERTAINTIES
about CONTEMPORARY RISKS
207
Chema Madoz
CERTAINTY
Natech risks will occur in 
the future more often and 
in many more ways. 
Risk mitigation actions 
are needed to control the 
severity of the effects.
Resilience enhancement 
is also crucial for the 
recovery of the affected 
entities from whatever 
effects. 208
How to promote risk 
mitigation & 
resilience through a 
plethora of 
uncoordinated rules 
and regulations?
Which planning philosophy  
can accommodate the 
management of 
heterogeneous and 
unprecedented threats?
Chema Madoz
A grand vision of 
“comprehensive planning”
that doesn’t consider the 
separating lines between 
political  & administrative 
competences & 
jurisdictions;  also between 
the origin/nature of 
natural and human 
induced disasters whose 
common denominator are 
the domino & systemic 
effects. 
STRATEGIC & REGULATORY (Land Use) PLANNING
to serve Risk Mitigation & Resilience Enhancement
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LAND USE PLANNING
PROCESS
SAFE CONTACT makes use of certain 
techniques and tools 
(technical 
environmental works, 
large free spaces, 
functional road 
networks, green belts,  
fire belts, land use 
zoning…) that can not 
only make the 
environment look 
safe(r),  
but secure safety, too.
Parkeharrison,Turning to spring, 2001
LAND USE PLANNING
DESIGNING 
TECHNIQUES
SAFETY
HALTING 
THE DYNAMIC 
DESTRUCTIVE 
INTERACTIONS
&
is part f spatial
planning and an
important process,
not only for segregation
of residential
agricultural, forestal
and industrial  ar a -
uses , but lso for
guaranteeing their safe
proximity, contact,
interconnection,
interrelation.
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FROM STRATEGY 
TO  TRAGEDY
http://images.spaceref.com/modis/image08282007_md.jpg
GREECE ON FIRE – SUMMER 2007
he worst 
ecological, economical 
and human disaster 
in Greece, 
since the 2nd World War.
NATIONWIDE STATE OF EMERGENCY
211
Winged victory statue, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/08/images/070827-greece-fires.jpg
The World’s Cultural Heritage 
under siege…
The ancient city of Olympia, 
birthplace of the Olympic 
games and UNESCO’s World 
Heritage Site in fire. 
Livadaki village, Southern Greece, ht p://i.l.cnn.net/cnn/2007/WORLD/europe/08/29/greece.fires/art.greece.damage.ap.jpg
65 lost lives.             
Hundreds of 
environmental 
refugees.
Disrupted 
life-lines 
(water, 
electricity, 
telephones) 
R ral villages, u
cultivations, fields 
and 268.834 
hectares (European  
Forest Fire Informational 
System) (12%) of the
cou try’s forest 
land burnt. 
The whole 
country 
threatened by a 
generalized 
blackout from 
the steam -
electric station of 
Megalop lis.
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http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/44080000/gif/_44080261_greece_fires2_416map.gif
NATECH DISASTER?
1. TRIGGERING MECHANISM:
Natural phenomena (drought, high temperatures (3 
concecutive heat waves), strong-persisting winds)
2. PRIMARY EFFECTS:
DOMINO EFFECTS
Life-line disruption (water, electricity, telephones).
Cut off local and translocal road networks.
Destruction of the local agricultural infrastructure.
Persistent burning of the steam-electric industry’s mine in 
Megalopolis contaminating the environment.
Potential generalized blackout.
3.  SECONDARY EFFECTS:
Potential damages due to future floods and geological risks 
(landslides, subsidence) 
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PREVENTION – MITIGATION
1. No (or not cleared) fire belts to 
stop the fire –spreading.
2. No land use planning.
3. No concerted action between 
spatial planning administration, 
forestry service and civil 
protection.
4. No dissemination of lessons 
learnt to a large audience of 
policy-makers and practicioners.
WHAT
WENT
WRONG
?
PARDNESS
1. Inadequate planning of the 
actions and fire fighting 
processes of supression 
mechanism 
2. Not appropriate training and 
fire fighting infrastructur  and 
equipment 
3. No dissemination of information  
and lack of training of citizens 
for emergency evacuation.
EMERGENCY EVACUATION 
No early warni g systems about 
emergency evacuation (church 
bells in some cases)
.  information and uiding 
during eme gency evacuation
3. Vehicles were trapped and 
burnt in the insufficient local 
and transloc l road syste  of 
the villages.
RES O SE
co-ordination. 
2. Many fire ignitions a d 
proportionally few firemen and 
fire extinction mea s.
3. Operational incapacity of the 
fire-fighting planes and 
helicopters due to th  s r ng 
win s, poor visibility…
4. Operational incapacity of 
firemen and vehicles at the 
mountainous vill ges du  to the 
topographic relief.
No specific 
management 
system 
for natech
disasters.214
1) Accommodation and 
compensation to the fire victims. 
2) Special environmental research 
for NATURA areas. 
3) Works on maintenance and 
clearance of the ancient 
Olympia. Landscapes’
restoration, special attention on 
the anti flooding protection. 
4) Reformation of a zoning plan 
and sustainable development of 
the damaged by fires regions. 
The 7 
key points
of the state’s 
(proposed)
Recovery Plan 
5 Research and implementation of 
infrastructure works (roads, water 
supply, irrigation works etc) for the 
viabl  and quick developm nt of 
the a ea.
Anti corrosion and anti flooding 
protection works to avoid problems 
coming from rainfalls. 
6) R inforcement of business 
initiatives aiming to the area’s 
development. 
7) Support of tourism and th  
heavy industry of Gre ce.
Chema Madoz
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STARTING 
FROM 
SCRATCHScientific gaps (risk assessment)and lack of social awareness 
(perception of social 
vulnerability, natech scenarios).
Issues of hierarchies, 
responsibilities and institutions.
Incompatibility among long 
term (sustainable) and short 
term (emergency response)
strategies. 
GAPS
Chema Madoz
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Risk reduction as a policy 
priority, incorporated into post 
disaster reconstruction.
Social and structural 
vulnerability assessment.
Appropriate legal and 
regulatory framework, strong 
institutions and coordination.  
STARTING 
FROM 
SCRATCHCoalition building among local
gove nments and cademic 
institutions to develop a 
culture of tact fl w of o
knowledge and cross-sectoral 
and multi-disciplin ry 
practices.
Risk communication between: 
Decision mak rs, Planners, 
Educators, C mmunity 
leaders, General public.
More effect ve me sures and 
tools to re ch clear 
protection goals and 
bjectives.
Integration of stuctural and 
on-structural hazard 
prevention and mitigation 
activities.
Shift from reactive disaster 
response to proactive risk 
reduction.
STRATEGIES  TECHNIQUES
TOOLS
Chema Madoz
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The actions 
concerning natech disasters’ risk 
management in Greece 
should be seen as a vital part of 
development and planning, 
and spatial development 
should keep pace with the risk reduction 
process.
thank
you
!
The power of protection
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ANNEX 3 
 
CASE STUDY MATERIALS 
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Definitions 
 
1. Peak ground acceleration (PGA) 
Peak ground acceleration is a measure of earthquake acceleration. Unlike the Richter 
magnitude scale, it is not a measure of the total size of the earthquake, but rather how 
hard the earth shakes in a given geographic area. Peak ground acceleration can be 
measured in g (the acceleration due to gravity) or m/s². 
 
2. Modified Mercalli Intensity scale (MMI) 
The Mercalli intensity scale is a scale used for measuring the intensity of an earthquake. 
The scale quantifies the effects of an earthquake on the Earth's surface, humans, objects 
of nature, and man-made structures on a scale of 1 through 12, with 1 denoting a weak 
earthquake and 12 one that causes almost complete destruction. 
 
3. Moment Magnitude scale (Mw) 
The moment magnitude scale was introduced as a successor to the Richter scale and is 
used by seismologists to compare the energy released by earthquakes. The moment 
magnitude is now the most often used estimate of large earthquake magnitudes. 
 
4. Hazard 
A hazard is a source of danger. A hazard does not necessarily lead to harm but represents 
only a potential to result in harm. 
 
5. Vulnerability 
The vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope 
with, injury, damage or harm. 
 
6. Risk 
Risk is the combination of the frequency, or probability, of occurrence and the 
consequence of a specified hazardous event. Risk therefore includes the likelihood of 
conversion of a hazard into actual delivery of injury, damage or harm. 
 
7. Natech 
A Natech disaster is a technological disaster triggered by any type of natural disaster. The 
technological disaster can include damage to industrial facilities (including lifelines) 
which results in significant adverse effects to the health of people, property, and/or the 
environment. 
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CASE STUDY 1: COVER CITY, CA, USA 
Based on work by A. M. Cruz and L. J. Steinberg 
Instructions: 
Read the following case study description before we do the actual case study exercise on Tuesday 
morning, 18 Sept 2007. This is your community. You will need to become familiar with it. If you 
have any questions you will be given some time for questions and clarification before we start the 
actual case study exercise. 
On Tuesday morning, you will be assigned to a Rapid Natech risk assessment (RNRA) team for 
your community. Each team member will be given a role to play, for example, head of the fire 
department, mayor, head of environmental group, representative of community association, or 
industry owner, among others.  
A step-by-step description of the RNRA methodology follows the case study description. Go 
through the RNRA process with your group mates. All decisions should come from group 
consensus and should be appropriately supported. 
At the end of the exercise you will be given time to prepare a short summary and a presentation 
of your case study results. 
A. Case Study Description 
1. Introduction 
Cover is a city in California, USA, located within Los Angeles County. There are more than 17 
million people living in Los Angeles County, 1.6 million alone live in Cover. Cover is chosen for 
the analysis because it is highly urbanized (population density is approximately 3041 persons/km2), 
it is home to a large number of industrial facilities that handle hazardous materials (hazmats), and it 
is bisected by several faults placing this region at high earthquake risk.  
The City of Cover is intersected by three major faults - NI– PV, and PH – which are capable of 
producing 7.1 magnitude or greater earthquakes. Careful natural hazard assessment indicates that 
the greatest risk to the city of Cover may come from a large earthquake on the NI fault. The 
expected maximum magnitude1 on this fault is 7.1 with a 5% probability of being exceeded in 50 
years. The earthquake’s impact is expected to be felt throughout the Los Angeles County. See 
Figure A3-1 showing a two maps of Cover indicating (a) the location of hazardous material 
storage tanks and emergency resources, and (b) the expected peak ground accelerations modeled 
for the earthquake.  
 Demographic Information 
Cover is a city of 1.6 million people, of which about 465,000 are less than 18 years of age. The 
average age of the population is 47.  Sixty five percent of the population in Cover are white, 16. 5 % 
are of Asian descent, and 5.5 % are African Americans. 11 % of the total population in this area is 
Hispanic.  
There are approximately 600,700 households. About 51% of the heads of households in Cover own 
their homes. Twelve percent of the households earn less than US$10,000 a year, 32 % make 
between US$30,000 and US$60,000 a year, and the rest make more than US$ 60,000 a year.  The 
population in Cover are well educated. Only 3% of Cover residents did not complete high school 
                                                 
1 The expected maximum magnitude is related to the tectonic setting, geometry, and type of the seismic 
source. Empirical correlations are generally used to determine the expected maximum magnitude based on 
the length of rupture of the fault, and the total length of the fault trace or the area of the fault rupture zone. 
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education, twenty percent have at least high school education, and 77 % have obtained a two-year 
college degree or higher.  
 Hazardous Materials at Industrial Facilities 
There are 40 industrial facilities in Cover subject to risk management requirements for chemical 
accident prevention according to the United States’ Risk Management Planning (RMP) rule. These 
facilities house over 100 storage tanks containing hazardous materials in quantities that exceed 
RMP thresholds and thus are regulated by this rule. In addition there are hundreds of smaller 
industrial facilities that house other hazmats in smaller quantities that do not surpass the RMP 
threshold and thus are not regulated by the rule. The hazmats present at the many industrial facilities 
in Cover pose a major threat to its people, property and the environment during a major earthquake 
(magnitude 7.0 or greater). For simplicity of the case study exercise we will only include 20 hazmat 
containing storage tanks in the RNRA exercise. See Spreadsheet 1. 
2. Potential Consequences of the Earthquake 
 Casualties 
A magnitude 7.1 earthquake on the NI fault is expected to cause over 100,000 casualties, 
including over 1500 people killed in Los Angeles County. In the city of Cover we can expect 
about 1000 fatalities, 1200 life threatening injuries, over 11000 hospitalizations, and over 60500 
people requiring medical aid.  
 Building damage 
The earthquake is expected to result in moderate damage to over 300,000 residential buildings, 
with over 70,000 sustaining major damage in the city of Cover. It is estimated that approximately 
50,000 commercial buildings will suffer damage, with 15,000 suffering major damage. The scope 
and damage to residential and commercial buildings has major implications for emergency 
response (e.g., urban search and rescue, emergency medical services, emergency access).  
 Displaced Households 
An earthquake along the NI fault will potentially displace thousands of families and individuals. 
Households can be displaced due to several factors including loss of habitability of the residential 
building, fire following the earthquake, loss of electrical power or water supply, and hazardous 
materials releases. In the case of a hazardous material release concurrent with loss of habitability 
of the residential building the threat to individuals is greatly increased particularly if the hazmat 
release involves a toxic plume. Shelter-in-place which is usually the preferred emergency 
response action following toxic plume releases may not be possible because homes no longer 
provide adequate protection. It is estimated that approximately 130,000 households will require 
shelter.  
 Debris 
A major source of debris from this earthquake will be structures that have been completely 
damaged or have collapsed. Debris will include building contents as well as structural and non-
structural elements. Debris becomes a major problem when it blocks roads and highways, or 
access to emergency resources. Furthermore, debris from partially damaged or completely 
damaged buildings often results in damage to adjacent electrical power lines and poles. 
 Power and water distribution systems  
Damage to power and water distribution systems will affect emergency response to earthquake 
victims and will hamper containment of hazmat releases.  Furthermore, damage to power and water 
systems can exacerbate hazmat problems, as well as become the cause of hazmat releases. Based on 
experience from previous earthquakes it can be expected that electrical power supply will be 
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severely hampered by the earthquake and that damage to high pressure water mains and water 
distribution systems will result in little or not water available in many areas of the city. 
 Oil and gas pipelines 
Damage to oil and gas pipelines will result in leaks, fires and explosions. Based on world wide data, 
Erdik (1998) found that about 0.5-1 gas pipe breaks per one kilometer pipe occur during shaking 
intensity level MMI VIII, depending on soil and pipe conditions. Rates can increase about 50 % in 
shaking intensity level MMI IX. During the Northridge earthquake (magnitude 6.8) there were 35 
gas system failures in older transmission lines, 123 failures of steel distribution mains, 117 failures 
in service lines, and 394 corrosion related leaks, during an earthquake that has been considered mild 
with respect to future earthquakes that can be expected in the region. In addition, there were reports 
of approximately 110 earthquake-related fire ignitions. It is expected that over 400 gas leak related 
fires will occur during the NI 7.1 magnitude earthquake in Cover alone. Other gas leaks and fires 
are expected throughout the Los Angeles County. 
Following the earthquake, fires caused by gas line and petroleum pipeline breaks will compete with 
industrial fires and hazmat releases for firefighting resources, adding an additional burden to already 
stressed emergency response officials. Furthermore, gas leaks and fires from household distribution 
lines will contribute to the already precarious situation.  
 Roads and Bridges 
A 7.1 magnitude earthquake along the NI fault can cause extensive damage to bridges and elevated 
highways. Erdik notes that the Northridge earthquake caused heavy damage to 10 viaducts and 157 
bridges. In addition, collapse and other damage (to bridges) resulted in the closing of 11 major 
roads in downtown Los Angeles. Damage to road overpasses and bridges cut off police department 
personnel (and other emergency responders) from their homes following the Northridge earthquake. 
Arrangements had to be made to provide temporary housing and food for emergency response 
personnel.  
Damage to roads and bridges may not always result in isolation of whole areas. However, it will 
most likely result in traffic congestion, and longer travel times, delaying the arrival of emergency 
fire and hazmat teams. Use your own judgment to estimate the potential damage caused by the 
earthquake to roads and bridges. 
Critical Facilities 
Critical facilities in this case study refers to those facilities that are essential for emergency response 
and for ensuring public safety. These include drinking water and sewer and waste water treatment 
plants, airports, hospitals, fire stations, police stations, major shelters, and emergency operations 
centers. 
There are two drinking water treatment plants and one waste water treatment plant in the city of 
Cover. The drinking sewer/waste water treatment plant is considered one of the biggest in the 
United States. There are over 60 acute care hospitals in Cover. About 20 facilities, including the 
drinking water and sewer/waste water treatment plants, are located within 8 km from the NI fault 
line, and about 90 % are located within 40 km from the fault line. The hospitals in the city of Cover 
are expected to be 50 %  to 75 % functional following the earthquake. The earthquake is expected 
to affect the entire Los Angeles County area. 
3. Emergency Response Resources 
The city of Cover’ Department of Emergency Management oversees all emergency management 
operations. There is an Emergency Operations Center building. There is also a separate building 
used as the emergency call center.  
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 Police Department 
The Police Department is responsible for maintaining peace and order, enforcing laws, and 
preserving life and property. The Police Department works closely with the Fire Department to 
coordinate evacuation or blocking-off of areas as required for example due to a toxic chemical 
release. There are over 15 Police Stations in Cover. 
Fire Department  
Responsibility for enforcement of industrial risk management and emergency response to hazmat 
incidents, and fire suppression fall under the Cover Fire Department (FD). The Cover FD has 20 
local Fire Stations spread out throughout the city with at least some firefighting capacity. Two of 
these fire stations have hazmat teams. Local fire stations carry out fire suppression, search and 
rescue operations, provide emergency medical services, and respond to industrial fires and hazmat 
releases, explosive threats and hazmat releases from transportation and railcar accidents, as well as 
releases from petroleum and chemical pipelines. It is expected that during the 7.1 magnitude 
earthquake along the NI fault the FD will most likely be overwhelmed responding to earthquake 
victims and residential fires caused by gas leaks.  
 Hazmat Teams 
There are 2 hazmat teams in Cover City. The hazmat teams consist of hazmat trained 
firefighters, which are part of two of the 20 local fire stations in the city. Therefore, in 
addition to responding to hazmat releases, the hazmat team members respond to residential 
fires and other non-hazmat related problems, such as medical emergencies.  
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CASE STUDY 2: ANKESI, TURKEY 
A. M. Cruz and E. Krausmann 
1. Introduction 
The City of Ankesi is located within Kocaeli Province in Turkey. The province is home to over 1.2 
million people. The population density of Ankesi is 400 persons/km2. The whole region is highly 
urbanized and industrialized, with 30% of Turkey’s industrial production being located there. The 
Kocaeli Province, including the City of Ankesi, is subject to high seismic risk due to its lying on the 
North Anatolian fault system that has produced large earthquakes in the past. The last one occurred 
on 17 August, 1999, where a Mw = 7.4 earthquake resulted in over 17000 deaths, extensive damage 
to residential and commercial buildings, as well as multiple hazardous-materials releases due to 
damage to industrial facilities. The North Anatolian fault is expected to trigger earthquakes in the 
Mw = 7+ range. See Figure A3-2 showing a map indicating the location of hazardous material 
containing storage tanks, and the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) values for the 17 August 1999 
earthquake in Kocaeli Province.  
 Demographic Information 
Ankesi city has a population of approximately 350,000 people. Approximately 67 % of the 
population is between the ages 15-60 years. A large percentage of the population works in industry 
and local commerce. Average monthly household income is US$1,484.00. There are slight 
differences in educational level of men and women. Population data for Turkey indicate that about 
90 % of men and 87 % of women complete primary education, and about 61 % men and 52 % 
women complete secondary education. About 23 % of men and 15.5 % of women have completed 
college degrees. These numbers are greatly influenced by Turkey’s still relatively large rural 
population. These numbers could be considerable higher for Ankesi. Poverty rates for the Marmara 
Region is at a low 1.4 %.  
Hazardous Materials at Industrial Facilities 
Ankesi is home to Turkey’s heavy industry, in particular state-owned petrochemical complexes, 
fine- and general-chemicals industry, metallurgical and automobile industries to name a few. The 
vicinity of these facilities to an important tectonic fault line and their handling or storing of 
hazardous materials gives rise to concern over their performance during strong ground-shaking 
conditions. 
Turkey regulates the storage, processing, and disposal of hazardous chemicals and flammable 
substances under the Environmental Law of 1983. These environmental regulations require 
facilities to report inventories of hazmats on site, and report any accidental hazmat releases and air 
emissions. Companies are required to carry out wastewater treatment on-site; and to send hazardous 
wastes (solid and liquid) to a municipal treatment facility. The implementation of mitigation 
measures to reduce the risk of accidental hazmat releases, and the establishment of emergency 
management plans for hazmat releases are mandatory. However, although most of Turkey is at high 
risk for seismic activity (Tang 2000), there is no law requiring the development of emergency 
management plans that specifically prepare facilities to respond to hazmat accidents following an 
earthquake. 
In the Kocaeli region there are more than 40 industrial facilities that handle hazardous materials, 15 
of these alone are located in Ankesi. These facilities house more than 70 hazmat containing storage 
tanks. In addition there are hundreds of smaller industrial facilities that house other hazmats in 
smaller quantities that are not regulated by the Turkish Environmental Law. The hazmats present at 
the many industrial facilities in Ankesi pose a major threat to its people, property and the 
environment during a major earthquake (magnitude 7.0 or greater). For simplicity of the case study 
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exercise we will only include 20 hazmat containing storage tanks in the RNRA exercise. See 
Spreadsheet 1. 
2. Potential Consequences of the Earthquake 
 Casualties 
An earthquake of magnitude 7+ in Ankesi city is expected to cause more than 12,000 casualties, 
including over 5000 fatalities and 7000 serious injuries. 
 Building damage 
The earthquake is expected to result in damage to more than 70,000 residential buildings, and 
with complete collapse of 15,000 residential and commercial buildings in Ankesi city. The 
damage to buildings has major implications for emergency response (e.g., urban search and 
rescue, emergency medical services, emergency access).  
 Displaced Households 
An earthquake along the North Anatolian fault will potentially displace thousands of families and 
individuals. Households can be displaced due to several factors including loss of habitability of 
the residential building, fire following the earthquake, loss of electrical power or water supply, 
and hazardous materials releases. In the case of a hazardous material release concurrent with loss 
of habitability of the residential building the threat to individuals is greatly increased particularly 
if the hazmat release involves a toxic plume. Shelter-in-place which is the preferred emergency 
response action may not be possible because homes no longer provide adequate protection. It is 
estimated that about 150,000 people will be homeless as a result of this earthquake and will 
require public shelter. 
 Debris 
A major source of debris from this earthquake will be structures that have been completely 
damaged or have collapsed. Debris will include building contents as well as structural and non-
structural elements. Debris becomes a major problem when it blocks roads and highways, or 
access to emergency resources. Furthermore, debris from partially damaged or completely 
damaged buildings often results in damage to adjacent electrical power lines and poles. 
 Power and water distribution systems  
Power and water-distribution systems are particularly vulnerable to a strong earthquake due to 
strong shaking and soil-liquefaction failures. Damage to power transmission and water distribution 
systems can affect emergency response to earthquake victims and can hamper containment of 
hazmat releases. Furthermore, damage to power and water systems can exacerbate hazmat 
problems, as well as become the cause of hazmat releases. Based on experience from previous 
earthquakes it can be expected that electrical power supply will be interrupted by the earthquake 
and that damage to high pressure water mains and water distribution systems will result in little or 
no water available in many areas of the city. 
 Oil and gas pipelines 
Damage to oil and gas pipelines can result in leaks, fires and explosions. Based on world-wide data, 
Erdik (1998) found that about 0.5-1 gas pipe breaks per one kilometer pipe occur during shaking 
intensity level MMI VIII, depending on soil and pipe conditions. Damage percentages can increase 
about 50 % in shaking intensity level MMI IX.  
Following the earthquake, fires caused by gas line and petroleum pipeline breaks will compete with 
industrial fires and hazmat releases for firefighting resources, adding an additional burden to already 
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stressed emergency response officials. Furthermore, gas leaks and fires from household distribution 
lines will contribute to the already precarious situation.  
Following the Kocaeli earthquake authorities reported only minor residential fires due to gas leaks. 
A similar situation might be expected from this earthquake. 
 Roads and Bridges 
An earthquake can cause extensive damage to bridges and road overpasses. In addition, the collapse 
and other damage to bridges can result in the closing of major roads, thereby disconnecting and 
isolating areas. This was observed both during the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake. Damage to 
transportation lifelines may not always result in isolation of whole areas. However, it will most 
likely result in traffic congestion, and longer travel times, delaying the arrival of emergency fire and 
hazmat teams. Use your own judgment to estimate potential damage to roads and bridges. 
Essential Facilities 
Essential facilities in this case study refers to those facilities that are critical for emergency response 
and for ensuring public safety. These include drinking water and sewer and waste water treatment 
plants, airports, hospitals, fire stations, police stations, major shelters, and emergency operations 
centers. 
Drinking and waste-water systems, in particular water pipelines and sewer pipes are susceptible to 
heavy damage due to ground deformation during a 7+ earthquake. This may result in a loss of water 
supply in many areas in Ankesi city. The main water pipeline which supplied water to the Kocaeli 
area’s industry failed in more than 14 different locations during the Kocaeli earthquake rending it 
useless.  
Public hospitals have been retrofitted to withstand increased earthquake loads and are expected to 
perform better than private hospitals. During the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake 26% of the hospitals in 
the affected area were damaged beyond repair, so we assume that about 70% of the hospitals in the 
case study region will be functional following the earthquake. 
There is one drinking water treatment plant and one sewer water treatment plant in Ankesi. The 
drinking water treatment plant is located next to the Marmara Sea. It suffered minor damages during 
the Kocaeli earthquake and has undergone some earthquake retrofitting.    
 Emergency Response 
The rapidly growing city of Ankesi has a moderately-well developed emergency-response 
organization. Having suffered through the Kocaeli earthquake, government authorities have made 
efforts to improve based on lessons learned from the past. Ankesi government officials work closely 
with industry owners/operators to insure proper response to industrial accidents. The City of Ankesi 
has 8 fire stations, two of these with some hazmat containment capacity. None the less, with limited 
economic resources, even one major Natech accident affecting Ankesi will require the aid of private 
hazmat fighting personnel (two industrial facilities in Ankesi have onsite fire fighting capacity and 
some hazmat trained personnel) as well as outside aid from other cities or provinces assuming that 
these have not also been impacted by the earthquake.  
Therefore, for the purpose of this case study it is assumed that the emergency response capacity will 
be quickly exceeded by the earthquake. As an example, during the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake both 
governmental and non-governmental emergency response organizations were overwhelmed by the 
demand for their intervention. Fire departments throughout the region, including those in Istanbul 
where overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster.  
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CASE STUDY MAPS 
Figure A3-1. Maps of Cover City 
        (a)      (b) 
 
Figure A3-2. Map of Ankesi City 
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Methodology for estimating vulnerability to earthquake due to storage 
tank type and design* 
*Prepared by V. Cozzani 
The vulnerability of equipment to the natural event in the case of earthquakes may be 
calculated by simplified empirical models, obtained from observational data. 
The models relate a parameter of the expected seismic event, the horizontal peak ground 
acceleration (PGA) to the equipment damage probability (more precisely, to the 
probability of a given damage state to be caused by the earthquake). These models, 
named fragility models have the following general expression: 
[ ] )PGA,,(f|orDSRSF βμ=α  (1) 
where the fragility curve F expresses the cumulative lognormal distribution f, 
characterized  by mean µ and standard deviation β of exceeding the damage or risk state 
α. Recently, probit analysis was used for the linearization of the distribution f, obtaining a 
set of vulnerability models based on the following expression: 
( ) RS,DSPGAlnkkY 21 ∀+=  (2) 
where k1 e k2 are the model parameters and PGA is expressed in as a multiple of the 
gravity constant, g (9.81 m/s2). 
Although several alternative models were proposed [Fabbrocino et al., 2005; Salzano et 
al., 2003], Table A3-1 summarizes the models more suitable for application in the present 
framework [Antonioni et al., 2007; Campedel et al., 2007] 
 
Table A3-1: Constants of the probit models (to be used in eq.(2)). 
Type of equipment k1 k2
Atmospheric tanks, no details 4.66 1.54 
Anchored atmospheric tank 4.66 1.54 
Unanchored atmospheric tanks 5.51 1.34 
Horizontal pressurized storage tanks 4.50 1.12 
Pressurized reactors 4.36 1.22 
 
Thus, equipment vulnerability index may be calculated as follows: 
1) obtain the PGA of the reference seismic event considered for the site 
2) if necessary, evaluate the PGA value in g units (calculate the ratio of the PGA to the 
constant g in coherent units) 
230
3) select the proper values of the k1 and k2 constants to be used in eq.(2) on the basis of 
the equipment considered 
4) calculate the probit value, Y, by eq.(2) 
5) calculate the penalization index using Table A3-2. 
 
Table A3-2: Criteria for the assignment of the penalization index for equipment 
vulnerability in the case of earthquakes 
2. Vulnerability due to 
storage tank type and 
design 
(1: low, 5 high) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Range of damage prob. (%) 0 – 5 5 – 20 20 - 50 50 - 70 70 - 90 90 - 100 
Range of probit variable, Y < 3.36 3.36 – 
4.16 
4.16 - 
5.00 
5.00 – 
5.52 
5.52 – 
6.28 
> 6.28 
 
Methodology for estimating vulnerability to floods due to storage tank 
type and design* 
Prepared by V. Cozzani 
In the case of floods, both the analysis of past accidental events reported in specific 
databases and structural analysis indicate that the damage probability of process 
equipment is related to two specific parameters of the flood: the maximum height of 
water at the site and the velocity of the water. Either parameter characterizes a different 
type of flood: “flash-floods” or floods in narrow valleys or on hillsides may be 
characterized by low water height but high water velocities, while extended floods in 
flatlands are usually characterized by slow water velocities and high water heights. 
The two parameters may be correlated calculating an overall pressure acting on the vessel, 
obtained as the sum of a static pressure (due to water height) and of a dynamic pressure 
(due to water speed). A preliminary structural analysis of different categories of storage 
vessels joined to the revision of literature data and of past accidents allowed a qualitative 
identification of different hazard ranges for the overall pressure values [Campedel & 
Cozzani, 2007]. Since static pressure is related to water height and dynamic pressure to 
the square of water velocity, it was possible to obtain the plot reported in Figure A3-3. 
The plot identifies five different hazard zones, to which different values of the equipment 
vulnerability penalization index are reported. 
Thus, the equipment vulnerability index may be calculated as follows: 
1) obtain the values of the maximum water height and of water velocity for the reference 
event. If only one of these values is provided, assume “0” for the other. 
2) if necessary, convert the height value to meters and the velocity value to m/s 
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3) calculate the square of the velocity value (m2/s2) 
4) identify on the plot in Figure A3-3 the position of the point that represents the 
reference event selected (if velocity is 0, the point will be on the x-axis) 
5) identify the penalization index associated to the region to which the point representing 
the reference event is belonging 
 
Figure A3-3: Plot for the calculation of the equipment vulnerability in the case of floods. 
V2: square of water velocity; h: maximum water height. 
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Toxic Chemical Health Effects and Exposure Limits* 
*Prepared by A. M. Cruz 
To determine the potential impacts of a conjoint natural and technological disaster on an 
industry and nearby residents, it is important to understand what can happen to the large 
volumes of hazardous chemicals stored and handled at these industrial facilities during an 
accidental release. Although flammable chemicals such as propane and butane gases are 
hazardous, larger vulnerability zones may result from the release of toxic gases that can 
be transported by the wind. Some of the most commonly used chemicals in large volumes 
include anhydrous ammonia (NH3), hydrogen fluoride (anhydrous) (HF), and hydrogen 
sulfide (H2S) which are extremely dangerous. Some examples of uses of these chemicals 
in industry include:  
• Anhydrous ammonia is used at refineries to enhance pollution control systems for 
process heaters and boilers to reduce and control oxides of nitrogen (NOx). 
Anhydrous ammonia also results as a product taken out of oil process streams 
during the manufacturing of petroleum products (Leffler, 1985).  
• Hydrogen fluoride is used at refineries in the alkylation unit, which combines low 
molecular weight olefins with isobutane in the presence of HF to produce gasoline 
components of high octane rating. 
• Hydrogen sulfide is found in crude oil, and is a by product produced during 
hydrotreating. The process usually involves removal of the hydrogen sulfide from 
the hydrocarbon stream; and then the conversion of the lethal H2S to elemental 
sulfur, a harmless chemical (Leffler, 1985). 
The following sections present a brief summary on the toxicity of the above chemicals 
Hydrogen Fluoride (Anhydrous) 
Hydrogen fluoride is an extremely corrosive acid that can cause severe injury through 
skin and eye contact, inhalation, or ingestion. Skin contact results in tissue destruction 
and painful deep burns. HF can cause burn to the eyes, which may lead to permanent 
damage or blindness (USDHHS, 1978). Lund et al. (1997) found that human exposure to 
HF concentrations above 2.5 mg/m3 is associated with pronounced symptoms from the 
upper respiratory tract. The authors also report that exposure to 26 mg/m3 for three 
minutes induced lower airway irritation and mild symptoms from eyes and nose. 
Exposure to higher concentrations can result in damage to lungs, and fatal pulmonary 
edema (Dalbey et al., 1998). 120 ppm (USDHHS, 1978) and 122 ppm (Dalbey et al., 
1998) have been reported as the highest concentrations a human can tolerate for 1 minute, 
because of respiratory and skin irritation, and conjunctiva. Dalbey et al (1998) estimated 
a short-term (10-minute) exposure limit, similar to the Emergency Response Planning 
Guidelines (ERPG). Using a low uncertainty factor (UF = 10), they estimated that 130 
ppm of HF was a concentration to which most people could be exposed to for 10 min 
without having severe or irreversible health effects.  
Hydrogen fluoride can be absorbed by clothes and hair (Lund et al., 1997). Therefore, 
clothing contaminated with hydrogen fluoride should be removed immediately, as it can 
cause burns. Contaminated clothing should be placed in closed containers for storage 
until it can be discharged appropriately (USDHHS, 1978).  
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Anhydrous Ammonia  
Ammonia is a colorless, slightly flammable gas. It has a strong odor, with an odor 
threshold of 5 ppm. It is extremely irritating and corrosive to the eyes, skin, and 
respiratory tract. Exposure by inhalation causes irritation of the nose, throat, and mucous 
membranes. Lacrimation and irritation begins at 130 ppm. Eye contact is severely 
irritating and can cause permanent damage and blindness. Skin contact can cause severe 
irritation and burns (USDHHS, 1992). Toxic effects in vital organs such as the kidneys 
have also been reported (Boyd, MacLachlan, and Perry, 1944). Appelman, Berge and 
Reuzel (1982) note that there is inconsistency among reported toxicity data for ammonia. 
They found reports of exposure to 4500 mg ammonia/m3 air during 30 minutes to be 
lethal; while another report states that the lowest lethal dose for humans in about 3 hours 
is 7000 mg/m3. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. 
Department of Labor (USDHHS, 1992) report that accidental exposure to concentrations 
above 2500 ppm for up to two hours has been fatal. 
Protective clothing may not provide protection against permeation by ammonia. 
Additionally, liquid ammonia can attack coatings, and some plastics and rubber. 
Ammonia can react with certain compounds causing fires or explosions. It should no be 
allowed to contact copper, brass, bronze, or galvanized steel (USDHHS, 1992).   
Hydrogen Sulfide 
Hydrogen sulfide is a very toxic, colorless gas with a strong rotten-egg odor at very low 
concentrations (NIOSH, 1996; ATSDR, 1995). It is produced by the decomposition of 
organic material, sewer gas, petroleum industries, sulfur hot springs, natural gas, and 
others (ATSDR, 1995; Yant, 1930). Guidotti (1996) reports that the hydrogen sulfide 
exposure-response curve for lethality is very steep. The odor threshold is highly variable, 
between 0.01 – 0.3 ppm, with olfactory paralysis occurring at concentrations of 100 ppm 
and greater.  Eye and lung irritation occur at concentrations between 20 and 50 ppm.  
Pulmonary edema can occur at concentrations between 250 – 500 ppm especially when 
exposure is prolonged (Reiffenstein et al., 1992; Guidotti, 1996). Exposure to 
concentrations of 500-700 ppm can produce intense anxiety, respiratory stimulation, 
amnesia, and unconsciousness (“knockdown”) (Schneider et al., 1998; Reiffenstein et al., 
1992). According to Henderson and Haggard (1927), hydrogen sulfide in small amounts 
depresses the nervous system, in larger quantities it stimulates it, and in very large 
amounts it paralyzes the nervous system. Thus, concentrations above 1000 ppm usually 
result in rapid unconsciousness, cessation of respiration and death in a few minutes (Yant, 
1930; Henderson and Haggard, 1927; AIHA, 1963). 
Hydrogen sulfide absorption through the skin is not well documented. Yant (1929) found 
that in studies conducted by exposing skin directly to hydrogen sulfide gas, there were no 
symptoms of poisoning, discomfort or discoloration of the skin observed. However, 
Reiffenstein et al. (1992) reports discoloration, spots and rash after exposure to high 
concentrations. 
Exposure Limits 
The RMP Consequence Analysis Guidance put out by EPA (May, 1996) specifies toxic 
endpoints for a list of chemicals. The toxic endpoint specified for HF and NH3 are based 
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on the Emergency Response Planning Guideline – 2 (ERPG-2) values that will be defined 
below. Other commonly used toxic endpoints include the Immediately Dangerous to Life 
and Health (IDLH) values, the Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) and the Threshold 
Limit Value – Time Weighted Average (TLV-TWA). For the purpose of the study, the 
ERPG-2 value was chosen as the specified toxic endpoint for the hazard assessment. 
ERPG 
The ERPG values are put out by the American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) 
and updated annually. The AIHA definition is: “The ERPG values are estimates of 
chemical concentration ranges where it might be reasonably anticipated observing 
adverse effects as a consequence of exposure to a specific substance.” There are three 
ERPG values for each guide, defined by AIHA as follows: 
• ERPG-3 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all 
individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing 
life-threatening health effects. 
• ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all 
individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing 
irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair an 
individual’s ability to take protective action. 
• ERPG-1 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all 
individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing other than mild 
transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor.  
IDLH  
IDLH stands for immediately dangerous to life or health. IDLHs are established by the 
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health. The purpose of establishing an 
IDLH is to “ensure that an exposed worker can escape from a given contaminated 
environment in the event of failure of the respiratory protection equipment.” The IDLH is 
the maximum concentration from which a person must escape within 30 minutes to avoid 
irreversible health effects. 
PELs and TLVs 
OSHA and the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists establish the 
Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) and the Threshold Limit Value – Time Weighted 
Average (TLV-TWA), respectively, as occupational exposure limits. A PEL or a TLV is 
the maximum average air concentration that most workers can be exposed to for an 8-
hour workday, 40-hour workweek for a working lifetime (40 years) without experiencing 
significant adverse health effects.   PELs are regulatory, while TLV-TWAs are set as 
guidelines. However, TLVs have been updated frequently, and are usually more stringent 
that OSHAs PELs. PELs were published in 1968, hence the reason they are not used very 
often even though they are legally enforceable. Table A3-3 gives the various exposure 
limit values for HF, NH3 and H2S. 
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Table A3-3. Exposure limits for hydrogen fluoride, ammonia and hydrogen sulfide. 
Chemical Name 
Exposure Limit 
HF NH3 H2S 
ERPG-1 
ERPG-2 
ERPG-3 
  5 ppm 
20 ppm 
50 ppm 
    25 ppm 
  200 ppm 
1000 ppm 
 0.1 ppm 
  30 ppm 
100 ppm 
IDLH 30 ppm   300 ppm 300 ppm 
PEL   3 ppm     35 ppm   20 ppm 
TLV-TWA   3 ppm     25 ppm   10 ppm 
 
Low and high toxic endpoints limits were chosen based on the literature review for the air 
dispersion modeling for both the Chalmette and Torrance refineries. These values are 
presented in Table A3-4. 
Table A3-4. Toxic Endpoint Criteria Used for Air Dispersion Modeling 
Chemical Concentration Observed effects at concentration 
Hydrogen 
Fluoride 
120 ppm Highest concentration you can tolerate for 1-10 
minutes, because of the onset of conjunctival and 
respiratory irritation with stinging of the skin 
(USDHHS, 1978) 
Hydrogen 
Fluoride 
20 ppm 30 ppm exposure for three minutes induced lower 
airway irritation and milder symptoms from the 
eyes and nose (Lund et al., 1997; Dalbey et al., 
1998). The ERPG 2 value was selected for this 
range of symptoms = 20 ppm. 
Ammonia 
(anhydrous) 
300 ppm Concentrations in the range of 300 to 500 ppm will 
cause people to leave the area immediately (EPA-
CEPPO, 1998). 300 ppm is also the IDLH value. 
Ammonia 
(anhydrous) 
130 ppm Exposure to this concentration caused Lacrimation 
and nose and throat irritation (USDHHS, 1992) 
Hydrogen 
sulfide 
100 ppm Eye and lung irritation; olfactory paralysis, odor 
disappears (Guidotti, 1996; Reiffenstein et al., 
1992). This is also the IDLH value. 
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Overpressure physical effects2
 
  
20 psi (1.4 bar) Heavily built concrete buildings are severely damaged or demolished. 
10 psi (0.7 bar) Reinforced concrete buildings are severely damaged or demolished. 
Most people are killed. 
5 psi (0.35 bar) Most buildings collapse. 
Injuries are universal, fatalities are widespread. 
3 psi (0.21 bar) Residential structures collapse. 
Serious injuries are common, fatalities may occur. 
1 psi (0.07 bar) Window glass shatters 
Light injuries from fragments occur.  
 
 
1 psi ≅ 0.07 bar = 7 kPa 
  
                                                 
2 From http://www.atomicarchive.com/Effects/effects4.shtml 
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ANNEX 4  
Case-Study Report 
Application of RNRA Methodology to Cover City, CA 
Group B: Serkan Girgin, Anna Papachatzi, Xian Hua 
 
Methodology:  
For the calculation of RNRA scores, steps given in RNRA methodology document were 
followed. Case study description was thoroughly examined and based on obtained 
information, weights were given to scoring criteria by: 
• common judgment of the group members, 
• results of analytical calculation methods, 
• results of accident models. 
If available information or expertise is insufficient to assign case-specific weights to a 
criterion, i.e. evaluated cases can not be differentiated from each other for that criterion, a 
mean weight can be given to all cases or the criteria can be simply skipped. Since scoring 
methodology is based on taking the average of weights given to each criterion, leaving a 
criterion out of calculations does not influence the overall ranking of the average score. 
Based on this fact, it was decided not to include a criterion into calculation, if: 
• little or no information is available on the criteria in the case study description, 
• it is difficult to decide on weights in the limited time available for the study, 
• criterion is too broadly defined. 
The following criteria were skipped: 
• HRL Score 
o Vulnerability due to loss of safety and mitigation measures due to 
earthquake 
• Area Vulnerability Score 
o Population distribution 
o Number of highly vulnerable (old, sick, children) 
o Low income neighborhoods 
In order to determine weights of vulnerability due to storage tank type and design, 
vulnerability index calculation methodology given in “Vulnerability due to storage tank 
type and design – earthquakes” paper was used. Since methodology is straightforward and 
all information is available, scores were easily calculated. An Excel spreadsheet was 
utilized to facilitate required calculations. 
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Determination of vulnerability due to chemical properties and storage conditions 
qualitatively requires considerable expertise on chemical safety. But these criteria are 
actually directly related with physical characteristics of accidents, for which extensive 
technical literature and quantitative calculations methods exist. Although use of advanced 
accident models requiring detailed input data will not be practical for basic scoring 
purposes, simple models can be used. This way vulnerability score can be determined more 
scientifically and in an objective manner. With its simplicity of use and primitive data 
requirements, all of which are available in case-study documents, RMPComp is a perfect-
match for such a model. Hence, it was used to determine scoring weights of vulnerability 
due to chemical properties, quantity and storage conditions criteria. Maximum distance to 
endpoints (MDE) were calculated for each case, and based on these distances weights were 
given.  
Although vulnerability due to lack of risk management practices require detailed 
information on companies, which is not available, an approximation was made based on 
the size of companies. Companies are divided into two groups as local, small sized 
companies and well known, large sized, multi-national companies. Large companies are 
assumed to have adequate risk management practices. However, it should be noted that 
being a big, multi-national company does not always imply risk management is done 
properly. As Mr. Gupta mentioned, the worst industrial accident in the history had 
happened in such a company. 
For the calculation of domino effects score, MDE values calculated by RMPComp were 
utilized. No possible domino effect is assumed to be present if no other tank is found to be 
present within the MDE/2 distance of a tank containing a flammable substance. Weights of 
vulnerability due to increase in impact area were given based on MDE values of tanks that 
will be effected. Since toxic substances have generally larger MDE values compared to 
flammable substances, higher weights were given for such substances.  
In order to determine area vulnerability score, impact areas were calculated from MDE 
values. Since there was more than 4 order of magnitude difference in impact areas, 
logarithmic values were used for comparison. Number of people exposed and presence of 
population centers were determined from given maps. Similarly, vulnerability due to 
impact of Natech on public utilities, major lifelines, emergency resources, and ecosystems 
were all determined from the map. Presence of these utilities within the impact area and 
proximity to the impact area were used as weighting criteria. 
Results: 
In order to calculate average HRL, domino, area, and utility scores an Excel spreadsheet 
was prepared. Although Y indices and HRL scores was calculated for all tanks, due to time 
constraints final calculations could be done only for three selected tanks (T1, T8 and T17). 
Details of calculations are given in Tables 1- 5.  
 
Table 1. Calculation of Y Indices 
Tank PGA k1 k2 ln(PGA) Y 
T1 0.43 4.50 1.12 -0.84397 3.55 
T8 0.58 4.36 1.22 -0.54473 3.70 
T17 0.50 4.36 1.22 -0.69315 3.51 
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 Table 2. Calculation of HRL scores 
Tank Crit. 1 Crit. 2 Crit. 3 Crit.  4 Sum Index 
T1 1 5 - 4 10 3.33 
T8 1 1 - 4 6 2.00 
T17 1 1 - 1 3 1.00 
 
 
Table 3. Calculation of domino effects score 
Tank MDE Domino Crit. 1 Crit. 2 Crit. 3 Sum Index 
T1 32.0 - - - - - 0.00 
T8 1.1 Yes 5 4 4 13 4.33 
T17 2.1 No 1 0 0 1 0.33 
 
Table 4. Calculation of area vulnerability score 
Tank Area Crit. 1 Crit. 2 Crit. 3 Crit. 4 Crit. 5 Crit. 6 Sum Index 
T1 3217.0 5 3 - 5 - - 13 4.33 
T8 3.8 2 5 - 4 - - 11 3.67 
T17 13.9 3 3 - 3 - - 9 3.00 
 
Table 5. Calculation of public utility, lifelines, emergency resources score 
Tank Crit. 1 Crit. 2 Crit. 3 Crit. 4 Crit. 5 Sum Index 
T1 1 4 4 5 1 15 3.00 
T8 1 5 3 4 1 14 2.80 
T17 1 2 3 2 4 12 2.40 
 
Based on calculated score indices overall RNRA scores were calculated. Summary of the 
average and final RNRA scores are given in Table 6. 
Table 6. RNRA scores 
Tank HRL Score 
Domino 
Effects 
Score 
Vulnerability 
Score Utility Score 
RNRA 
Score 
T1 3.33 0.00 4.33 3.00 24.44 
T8 2.00 4.33 3.67 2.80 21.60 
T17 1.00 0.33 3.00 2.40 5.73 
 
Results 
Among the studies tanks, T1 containing Chlorine has been found to pose the greatest 
Natech risk in the territory. Although there is no possibility of domino effects for this tank, 
very large impact area and presence of population centers within the impact zone has been 
found to be the reasons for high RNRA score. T8 containing butane has also a high RNRA 
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score due to considerable domino effects. RMPComp results show that in case of an 
explosion this tank will affect three other tanks (T7, T6, and T9) in the vicinity. T6 and T9 
contain chlorine and anhydrous ammonia, respectively. Both of these substances are toxic, 
hence have large MDE values. This increases overall impact area of T8 and results in high 
RNRA score. Lowest RNRA score has been found for T17, which includes butane similar 
to T8. Although the amount of butane stored in T17 is a lot more than T8 (almost 10 folds) 
overall score is much lower, because T17 is away from other tanks (no domino effects) and 
emergency resources present in the vicinity. Taking these reasonable results obtained from 
the case study into account and considering that selected tanks have a great variability in 
chemical properties, storage conditions, location, and natural hazard risks, RNRA 
methodology can be deemed as satisfactory for rapid assessment of Natech risks. 
 
Recommendations: 
As mentioned in methodology part, use of simple analytical tools or models for 
determination of vulnerability due to chemical properties, quantity and storage conditions 
may facilitate application of RNRA methodology. As demonstrated in this study, 
RMPComp software of U.S. EPA can be used for this purpose. 
Although presence of ‘Other’ criteria in scoring tables allow one to include additional 
criteria that are deemed to be important, having a fixed set of criteria can make the use of 
methodology easier.  If the aim is “rapid” risk assessment, limiting the criteria to be 
considered will facilitate the task. It will also result in better standardization and make 
scoring results comparable among different studies. 
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Abstract 
The workshop: Assessing and Managing Natechs (Natural-hazard triggered technological accidents) was 
organised and hosted by the Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) at the Institute for the Protection and 
Security of the Citizen (IPSC) of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), on 17-18 
September 2007 in Stresa, Italy. The Natech workshop, the second of its kind to be organized the JRC, was 
carried out in an effort to provide a framework and practical tools for Natech risk assessment and management 
at the community level. The workshop included invited presentations on country practices which served to help 
monitor progress in Natech risk reduction since the first workshop in 2003.  
In addition to the country presentations, the two day workshop included discussion of key issues, presentations 
of new concepts/ information, hands-on exercises, and the development of case studies. In the case studies 
participants carried out a Natech risk assessment of a selected community. Discussion of case study results 
and possible Natech risk management strategies followed, as well as identification of future priorities for 
research and tool development. 
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The mission of the JRC is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical support
for the conception, development, implementation and monitoring of EU policies. As a 
service of the European Commission, the JRC functions as a reference centre of 
science and technology for the Union. Close to the policy-making process, it serves 
the common interest of the Member States, while being independent of special 
interests, whether private or national. 
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